

Foreign Aid Voting in Congress: Does Gender Matter?

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Abstract

Are female legislators in the United States more supportive of foreign aid than male legislators? Do they support specific types of foreign aid, such as economic aid, over others? Both American and International Relations scholars have found that gender matters. Women tend to support different policies than men and the percent of female legislators can make a difference on issues spanning from domestic legislation to a state's propensity to become involved in international conflict. Yet the impact of gender on foreign aid has not received much attention. In this study, I build upon the data utilized by Milner and Tingley (2010), which tests whether there are systematic political economy factors that shape preferences for foreign aid. They find that the economic characteristics of a district and the legislator's left-right ideological predispositions influence support for aid in a systematic fashion, but they do not consider the role of gender in their analysis. I argue that it is not only the legislator's left-right ideology and district economic characteristics that matter, but also the gender of the legislator. To test this, I re-run their analysis, which focuses on votes in the House of Representatives from 1979 to 2003 for increasing or decreasing foreign aid, and include a variable indicating whether each legislator was male or female. I find that even after controlling for economic and ideological characteristics, female legislators are less likely to support military aid. Regarding other types of aid, the relationship is more complicated and the interaction between party and gender must be taken into account.

Does gender matter in foreign policy decision-making? More specifically, how might gender affect support for foreign aid? Although not necessarily the focus of most foreign policy research, several studies, sometimes unexpectedly, have found that females do think or behave differently than males in a variety of foreign policy contexts. For example, Keller and Yang (2008), controlling for gender in their experiment testing the impact of leadership style and context on decision-making, find that even after controlling for different leadership styles,

men and women tend to make different decisions. Men are significantly more likely than women to choose the more forceful and less popular options, and men are also significantly less likely than women to view their citizens' preferences as very important in the decision-making process. Keller and Yang (2008) had not anticipated gender being an important explanatory variable, nor had they predicted any gender differences in their theory, thus they do not explore the potential international politics implications beyond noting these (to them) somewhat surprising findings. This lack of attention paid to gender is somewhat disconcerting. If women do make decisions differently than men, it is important that we understand why and how these decisions might affect foreign policy overall. As the number of female leaders increases, this could have significant implications for what direction U.S. foreign policy will take in the future. Thus, this study will focus specifically on evaluating whether female legislators in the U.S. House of Representatives vote differently than their male colleagues regarding foreign aid.

Understanding why members of Congress choose to support foreign aid or different types of foreign aid is a complex topic. While some scholars point to security concerns, others look at motivations of democracy and better human rights practices, and still others look at domestic political motivations, such as economic conditions, or individual preferences of members of Congress. Beyond these approaches to understanding foreign aid, and international relations more generally, a small but growing literature has begun to focus on gender. As more and more studies find that women hold different policy preferences than men, one is forced to consider why this might be the case. Do women think about policies differently than their male counterparts? Do women have a different preference ordering than males? If they do have different preference ordering, why do they? Is this the result of socialization? Under what types

of foreign policy decisions do these gender differences hold? While some of these questions are beyond the scope of this study, understanding general trends in gender differences in foreign aid voting is something we can test.

Foreign aid is one important tool of U.S. foreign policy that promotes strategic U.S. economic, military, and humanitarian interests abroad. Although several studies have found that female legislators do vote differently than their male counterparts regarding certain types of legislation, no study has yet empirically tested whether U.S. female members of Congress vote differently on foreign policy bills than male members. This study attempts to fill this gap in the literature by testing whether women do behave differently in their roll call votes on foreign policy expenditures in the U.S. House of Representatives than their male colleagues. This study progresses as follows. I begin by reviewing the literatures on foreign aid, gender voting in congress, and gender differences in foreign policy decisions. I then advance my theory and discuss the hypotheses I will be testing. In the final three sections I outline my analysis, test my hypotheses, and discuss my results and conclusions.

Foreign Aid

Several theories exist to explain what motivates U.S. foreign aid giving. In testing these theories, studies of foreign aid have been conducted at both the aggregate and individual levels. At the aggregate level, studies of foreign aid have largely focused around three major frameworks: 1) the system-level; 2) the societal-level; and 3) the state-level. The systemic level focuses on the international environment, specifically the distribution of power and how that affects states' security concerns. As Meernik et al. (1998) argue, this approach provides the most appropriate and powerful explanation of state behavior during the Cold War because of the bipolar competition during this period that seemed to provide support for the use of foreign aid as a means to secure countries against the threat of the Soviet Union (Meernik et al.,

1998; Griffin, 2008). Scholars have more recently argued that the end of the Cold War has eliminated the need for the United States to orient every international action toward the pursuit of national security. The societal-level approach thus views U.S. policy as the result of the influence of dominant classes, interest groups, or political parties. Finally, the statist approach sees the state as having its own goals that are separate from other groups in society, and it is these state goals that have the greatest influence on policy. With the end of the Cold War, policymakers might now devote greater attention and resources to the international promotion of U.S. ideological values such as democracy and human rights (Allison and Beschel 1992; Knack, 2004). Meernik et al. (1998) evaluate these three broad theories by testing what factors (i.e. whether the state is a U.S. ally, whether the state is a democracy, whether the state has a communist border) affect which states received more aid from the U.S., finding mixed results.

Regarding gender and foreign aid distribution, at the aggregate level, Breuning (2001) tests the impact that female legislators have on the amount of development assistance a country gives as a percent of Gross National Income. She finds that for OECD countries, when women make up 30 percent of the legislature or more, the state tends to allocate more funds for development assistance. This study is unique in its focus specifically on gender and foreign aid.

At the individual level, scholars have largely focused on aid allocation and what influences Congressional support for different types of foreign aid. Fleck and Kilby (2001) evaluate the relationship between support for foreign aid in the House of Representatives and the geographic distribution of USAID contract spending across congressional districts within the United States, but find little indication that this link exists. Other studies have found, however, that economic aid, specifically, benefits certain groups within the donor country (Brakman and Marrewijk, 1998) and this then makes donor governments more willing to provide aid. Milner and Tingley (2010) build on this by analyzing votes in the House of Representatives from 1979

to 2003 to decrease or increase foreign aid. They look at the impact that the political, economic, and ideological characteristics of legislators and their districts have on how each legislator votes on foreign aid and find that both ideology and economic characteristics matter. Members of Congress support foreign aid that will be economically beneficial to the constituents in their districts.

Despite this fairly extensive literature on foreign aid decision making, focusing on various motivations for foreign aid giving by the United States, few studies have evaluated the impact of gender on whether or not a Representative supports foreign aid, and more specifically, whether gender affects which types of foreign aid a Representative is more likely to support. Several studies have, however, evaluated gender decision-making in Congress and how that affects other types of policy.

Effect of Gender on Politics

Several theories exist for how legislators make decisions. Many focus on legislators as rational actors focusing on re-election (i.e. Mayhew, 1974). Others argue that interest groups shape Congressional decision-making (Truman, 1951; Hall and Wayman, 1990; Wright, 1990). Some scholars focus on partisanship and ideology (Edwards, 1989), and still others concentrate on pressure from constituents (Miller and Stokes, 1963). Some researchers have additionally looked at the impact of gender on legislator decision-making.

Several studies have evaluated how female legislators vary from their male counterparts in voting patterns, bill introductions, and policy at both the state and national levels. Thomas (1991), focusing on state legislatures, finds that states with higher percentages of female representative tend to introduce and pass more bills dealing with issues of women, children, and families. Vega and Firestone (1995) examine how gender affects legislative behavior from

1981-1992 and show that while female legislators do have more liberal voting patterns, they are not significantly different from their male counterparts prior to 1990. After 1990, however, they find that the difference between male and female legislators becomes significant. Similarly to other studies, they find that women introduce more women-related legislation, thus focusing on and bringing more attention to women's issues. Poggione (2004) finds that women express significantly more liberal welfare policy preferences than men, with the largest gender difference in legislators' preferences occurring among Republican and conservative legislators. Norton (1999), in evaluating voting dimensions in the 101st, 102nd, and 103rd Congresses, finds that votes on abortion, family planning, and clinic access are multidimensional and cannot be explained merely by the traditional ideological continuum. Instead, gender is important in how one votes on these issues. Votes on bills that challenge women's traditional roles or promote reproductive rights tend to have a gendered dimension. From these studies, we see that there is a trend in how female Representatives vote in relation to men and what types of bills women are more likely to support, at least regarding domestic policy. Women are more likely to support welfare policies and are more likely to introduce and support policies impacting women, children, and families. Overall, it appears that at least for certain issues, women vote more liberally than men.

Why do we see these differences in gender preferences for certain policies? It appears from these studies that women tend to care about issues that are more likely to affect women and children. Women are a fairly cohesive group on many issues. They want to support issues that matter to them and to help advance their situation as a group. Given that many women are likely to be caregivers and mothers, and are often expected to care more about the family and the home, this has led women to think about these issues somewhat differently than men and

focus more on issues that benefit women and children. Women, historically, have played a quite different role in society than men, which has led them to have a different perspective on which issues are more important. They had largely been left out of the political realm until recently, and one could argue are still largely underrepresented with only 75 women currently serving in the U.S. House of Representatives, a mere 17% of Representatives (Manning and Shogan, 2012). Thus, when women are in positions of power, such as Congress, they bring a different perspective with them, at least regarding certain issues, and that causes them to advocate for and support policies that will be beneficial to them as women, to children, and to families. This might sometimes put them at odds with their male partisan counterparts—especially if they belong to the Republican Party—but as previous research has shown, women do seem to care about different issues than men, and that shows in their behavior in office. I next consider how this gendered voting pattern and preferences translate to voting on foreign policy issues, specifically foreign aid.

Although few studies have focused on the role that gender plays in foreign policy, in general, those that have find that gender differences do exist. Women tend to bring more peace to foreign policy (i.e. Caprioli 2000, 2003, 2004; Hudson et al. 2009/10). Empirical research on foreign policy attitudes finds a gendered difference as well. Previous research evaluating the impact of gender on foreign policy preferences has largely focused on foreign policy attitudes based on survey data instead of legislative voting though. Fite et al. (1990) look at how men and women differ in their foreign policy attitudes and find a consistent gender gap in preferences for foreign policy goals and means. This gap is only partially accounted for by partisan and ideological differences. They find that gender is consistently among the most important demographic predictors of foreign policy attitudes among the American public.

Specifically, women tend to hold more altruistic foreign policy goals and orientations and show less support for military aid and use of troops than men. Fite et al. (1990) do not, however, find that women are more likely to support economic foreign aid, a finding which they believe is a result of women perceiving this aid as hurting the U.S. economy and leading to military involvement.

Other studies likewise find that women tend to have more altruistic preferences. It appears that this altruistic nature, found consistently across several studies, is what motivates women to have different preferences from men on certain issues. These findings help to illustrate my theoretical argument. Gidengil (1995) evaluates support for the 1988 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, finding that women tend to favor equity and to be more egalitarian. Women additionally have been found to value social justice (Papachristou 1990). Such values have been linked to support for development assistance (Noel and Thérien 1995). Togeby (1994) finds that women are in fact more supportive of aid to the developing world. Such findings are consistent with the findings in American Politics that women tend to support policies that benefit women and children. Development aid is in some ways an internationalized version of welfare, benefiting those most in need, including women and children. Breuning's (2001) results illustrating that more women in legislators results in more development aid appear consistent with these studies as well, particularly with Thomas's (1991) findings that when women are present in large numbers they do shift policy towards focusing on aid likely to benefit women and children and give more of it. Whether socialization is driving this altruistic nature in women or some other mechanism, women do tend to support foreign aid that benefits women and children.

Theory of Foreign Policy Attitudes and Gender

One might consider several different reasons for why women hold different views than men on certain policies. Among these different arguments are both sociological and psychological explanations. For example, many scholars advance the explanation that gender differences in legislators' attitudes are the result of women's experiences and responsibilities in the private sphere. These experiences are different from men's, and thus their attitudes and behavior tend to sometimes vary from men's because of these different experiences that socialize them differently (Tamerius 1995; Thomas 1994). Social psychological theories outlining fundamental differences in male and female relationships and orientations might provide an explanation as well. For the purpose of this paper I discuss two social-psychological theories, one focusing on interpersonal relationships and the other focusing on orientation towards hierarchy. These two theories help to explain why women and men differ in their opinions, behavior, and decisions, thus providing an explanation for why women would be more or less supportive of certain types of legislation than men.

The first social-psychological explanation focuses on interpersonal relationships. Bakan (1966) advances the idea of the feminine orientation towards interpersonal relationships as communal, "encompassing nurturant concern for others, interpersonal sensitivity, and expressivity, and the masculine orientation as agentic, characterized by self-protection, independence and self-assertion" (Pratto et al., 1997). Several scholars have found evidence of such gender differences (e.g. Eisenberg and Lennon 1983; Stimpson et al., 1992; Walker, 1992). These analyses focus more so on personality gender differences. From this explanation, we infer that women are more likely to support policies that are nurturing in nature, policies that would likely help, not hurt, others. Thus, it is likely that women would show more support

for policies that help women and children, both domestically and abroad, such as welfare policies or humanitarian foreign aid. On the other hand, military aid often leads to destruction, and women and children are frequently the victims of violence and rape during conflict, thus military aid would be the opposite of a nurturing policy, making women less likely to support it.

Another social-psychological theory departs from this more traditional view, focusing instead on intergroup relations. Pratto et al. (1997), using the theoretical framework of social dominance orientation (SDO), postulate that men and women differ in a fundamental social-psychological orientation, specifically, how much they favor group hierarchy versus group equality. Through experimental analysis, they find that women show more support of women's policies, gay/lesbian rights, and social welfare programs, policies that arguably promote equality, whereas men showed more support for military programs. SDO was able to account for gender differences in political ideology and party support as well as attitude differences. Women's propensity to favor equality as opposed to hierarchy would make them prone to support policies that promote equality such as development aid and not support policies that arguably enable group conflict, such as military aid.

These two social-psychological theories, and the subsequent studies testing these theories, indicate that women and men are different. Whether that is the result of their fundamental orientation or personality may be debatable, but these social-psychological differences do exist. While the purpose of this study is not to test the validity of either of these theories of gender differences or argue which one is better, these theories help provide an explanation for the why this gender gap exists, thus providing a theoretical foundation for why female and male legislators behave differently along gendered lines.

Gender is not the only factor that is likely to influence legislators' decisions though. If constituency preferences drive legislator decision-making, as previous individual-level foreign policy studies have found, I should expect to see no gender effect in my model or a gender effect tempered by constituency preferences (Miller and Stokes, 1963; Milner and Tingley, 2010). While Pratto et al. (1997) imply otherwise, perhaps female legislators actually vote differently than men, usually more liberally, because they come from districts where the constituents hold those preferences. Perhaps particular types of districts are more likely to elect female representatives. If, however, gender does play a role and female representatives, because of their social-psychological orientation that influences their attitudes and behaviors making them more altruistic and egalitarian, tend to hold different preferences than men, I would expect to see that even after controlling for constituency preferences gender will matter.

Building off the representation literature combined with the gender literature, I advance a model of decision-making that considers both constituency preferences and the idea that female legislatures, having social-psychological orientations and intergroup relations different from men, also have different preferences than men. Thus, while constituency preferences will explain some variance between legislators' decisions to support foreign aid, so too will gender.

Based on the previous studies from both the International Relations and American Politics literatures, women hold different preferences from men regarding support for foreign aid and specifically support for certain types of foreign aid. Additionally, within the American Politics context female legislatures at both the state and national levels are found to vote differently than men on certain issues, especially those issues concerning women, children, and families. Finally, countries with a high percentage of female legislatures are found to provide more development aid. Although the United States does not fall among the countries that have

a 30% female legislature, it is likely that we might find some differences in how women vote by looking specifically at roll call votes in the House of Representatives. If legislator voting on foreign aid is consistent with the gender gap found in public opinion by Fite et al. (1990), I would expect that female legislators would be less likely to vote for an increase in military aid and less likely to vote for economic aid. As previously discussed, women's orientation towards nurturing, egalitarian policies is likely to be in conflict with both military and economic foreign aid. Because military aid often leads to violence, of which women and children are frequently victims, such aid is the opposite of nurturing and may help promote hierarchies and intergroup conflict, which women are adverse to as well. Regarding economic aid, Fite et al (1990) find that women are more likely to view economic aid as hurting the U.S. economy and as leading to military involvement. Given the social-psychological explanation of women's preferences, female legislators may therefore see this aid as hierarchy- or conflict-promoting or as harmful to the U.S. economy, which would arguably contribute to inequality within the United States. Thus, they would be less likely to support economic aid. Based on these theoretical explanations, I will thus test the following two hypotheses:

H1: Female members of the House of Representatives will be less likely to support foreign military aid than male members.

H2: Female members of the House of Representatives will be less likely to support economic foreign aid than male members.

Foreign aid giving is largely motivated by the goals that that aid is meant to achieve. As of 2009, U.S. foreign aid is officially divided into five broad categories: 1) Bilateral Development Assistance; 2) Economic Aid Supporting U.S. Political and Security Objectives; 3) Humanitarian Assistance; 4) Multilateral Assistance; and 5) Military Assistance (Tarnoff and Lawson, 2009). Of the five categories, Bilateral Development, Humanitarian, and

Multilateral Assistance, which focus on assisting impoverished countries or aiding in natural disasters and include food aid and health care, would generally be motivated by altruistic goals and would likely benefit women and children more so than economic aid and military assistance, the latter of which is likely to have a negative effect on those groups. Thus, Bilateral Development, Humanitarian, and Multilateral aid are more likely to be supported by women. While roll call votes on foreign aid are not necessarily divide so neatly based on aid type, for the purpose of this study I evaluate 4 different foreign aid bill types: 1) high-focus economic aid; 2) low-focus economic aid; 3) military aid; and 4) food aid. Additionally, I combine the high- and low-focus aid into a fifth category of all economic aid. While this list does not specify all the types of aid previously discussed, they do encompass some of the types of aid. Food aid does fall under the category of humanitarian. I will use these bills to try to determine whether women do in fact hold more altruistic goals of foreign aid, and will thus test the following hypothesis:

H3: Female members of the House of Representatives will be more likely to support foreign food aid than male members.

Analysis

To test my hypothesis I utilize the roll call votes of members of the House of Representatives from the 96th-108th session of congress. I borrow this data from Milner and Tingley's (2010) study and replicate their models, including an additional measure of gender, which allows me to capture whether a gendered voting gap exists, and a measure for political party. The roll call votes in this dataset are for military aid, high salience economic aid, low salience economic aid, and food aid, which I discuss in detail in the following paragraphs.

Military aid votes dealt with the transfer of military aid to other countries. This aid

could take the form of military hardware or equipment (i.e. guns, missiles, ammunition, etc). It could also include logistical and training assistance for foreign soldiers. The high focus economic aid votes all concern economic aid amendments, which sought a general increase or decrease in foreign aid appropriations. According to the criteria discussed by Milner and Tingley (2010), high salience economic aid votes, “had clear financial consequences for economic aid distributed through key foreign aid programs, such as the main U.S. bilateral aid agency, USAID, or key multilateral organizations...and their sole content was to affect such aid flows; they did not involve other goals and policies” (210). These votes satisfy four criteria: (1) they had unambiguous financial effects on aid flows, (2) they were not related to aid directed at a particular country, (3) they did not deal with other key issues such as AIDS, labor rights, or abortion, and (4) they did not concern complicated procedural issues. Low salience economic aid votes involved foreign aid flows, but also concerned other procedural or policy areas, thus their potential economic impact was less clear. The theory I advance makes no distinction between types of economic aid, however, or whether high salience or low salience aid is likely to receive less support from women, thus I run my models with each type of aid separately for the sake of comparability with Milner and Tingley’s (2010) results and with both types of economic aid combined. The votes concerning food aid were for the main U.S. agricultural aid program administered under Public Law 480. Roll call votes for this category were quite rare compared to the others.

Because my dependent variable is a binary variable, I employ logistic regression analysis with robust standard errors to test the relationship between my independent variables and dependent variables. I run five separate models. I additionally generate predicted probabilities for any significant findings. My key independent variable across all five models is

whether the legislator is a female. This is a binary variable coded 1 if the legislator is female and 0 if he is male.

Two other considerations must be taken into account when testing the impact of gender on legislator voting behavior. The first is the role of parties and the potential interaction that may occur between party and gender. As Swers (1998) finds in her study on Congressional voting, the interaction between gender and party indicates that much of the impact of gender is due to Republican women. To account for this potential relationship, I rerun my five preliminary models controlling for the interaction between gender and party.

The second consideration is the shift in Republican female politicians from voting more liberally than their Republican male counterparts to voting more in line with their political party. Several scholars argue that following the 1994 elections, a new collection of conservative Republican women entered the House taking many positions in opposition to the traditional feminist causes (Swers 2002; Swers and Larson 2005). Frederick (2009) tests whether a greater ideological difference exists between female Democrats and Republicans as a result of these new conservative female legislators. He finds that in the 108th and 109th congresses, female House Republicans were not ideologically distinguishable from their male Republican colleagues. Prior to this time, however, the effect of gender on roll-call ideology and support for women's issues was stronger for Republican women than for Democratic women. Thus, to test whether this relationship holds in voting for aid, I code roll call voting for military aid for an additional two sessions of Congress (though the 110th Congress) to see if Republican female representatives behave more conservatively in the 108th-110th Congresses than in previous years.

Ideological Control Variables

In my models, I also control for other variables found to be significant predictors of roll-call voting on foreign aid. The first control variable is the party to which each legislature belongs. This variable is coded 1 if the representative is a Democrat and 0 if the representative is a Republican. I would expect Republicans to be less supportive of all these types of aid, except for military aid, than Democrats. My second control for ideology is the DW-Nominate score. This score measures the overall voting record of a legislator on a left to right scale compared with other legislators. Democrats, or more liberal legislators, tend to have negative scores, while Republicans, or more conservative legislators, tend to have positive scores. This variable then captures more than just the party affiliation of each legislator. It includes his or her relative conservativeness and liberalness as well based on previous votes. Political ideology is an important predictor of how a member of Congress will vote. In my models I would expect those scoring to the right, or more conservative, to be less supportive of all types of foreign aid except for military aid, with more liberal, or left-leaning, legislators showing the opposite trend. Another control for ideology and party influence included is presidential support for the bill. This variable is coded 1 if the president supported the bill and the legislator is from the same party as the president and 0 otherwise.

District Control Variables

As previously discussed, it is also likely that constituency preferences play a significant role in how a legislator votes, thus I also control for some district level variables including a measure of district ideology which is the percent in that district who voted for the Republican presidential candidate in the previous election. I control for economic factors that might influence a legislator's support for foreign aid. These include the percent of the district

employed in high skill labor and measures for the value of physical, fixed capital in manufacturing industries in a district. I include the logged median income of each legislator's district, the percent unemployed, and the 2-year change in the percent unemployed. These are meant to capture the wealth of the district and the current economic situation of that district. If members of congress respond to the needs of their districts, as much of the literature indicates they do, these variables should capture the economic considerations legislators take into account in deciding how to vote. Meernik and Oldmixon (2004) illustrate that congressional support for internationalism falls when domestic economic conditions deteriorate. Thus, I would expect that representatives from districts with high median income should be more likely to support more foreign aid and those from districts with higher unemployment should be less likely to vote in favor of aid disbursements. I additionally control for the percent black in each district, as a great deal of foreign aid is directed towards Africa, and the percent foreign born in each district, as foreign born populations may be more supportive of giving foreign aid to other countries. Finally, I include regional dummy variables for West, Mid-West, and South (with North as my reference category) to capture how regional variation might affect voting.

Additional Controls

Additional control variables include the percent of campaign contributions from private financial institutions, corporate PACs, and Labor PACs to test the impact of organized interests. I also control for the market value of agricultural products, which would likely be considered by legislators from agricultural districts and would likely influence votes for food aid.

Results

Table 1 depicts the results of my first three models, testing the impact of gender, ideology, district, and organized interest influence on support for military aid and economic aid. The negative and statistically significant coefficient for Female in my model testing roll call votes for military aid provides confirmation for hypothesis 1. Female legislators are less likely to support military aid than their male colleagues, even after controlling for political party, ideology, and district factors.

When looking within political parties, this trend holds for both Democrats and Republicans. As illustrated by the predicted probabilities in Table 3, female Democrats are nearly 29% less likely to vote in favor of military aid than their male counterparts and female Republican representatives are nearly 28% less likely to vote in favor of military aid than their Republican male colleagues. This finding is quite significant given the controls for ideology and constituency preferences and given that this trend holds across ideology and is not merely driven by more liberal or more conservative female legislators. Additionally, there is no difference between Democrat and Republican female representatives.

Controls for political party and DW-Nominate scores are not significant. Several of the district-level variables are significant though, including the control for the percent of the district voting for the Republican presidential candidate, which is positive and significant as would be anticipated. The direction and significance level of my control variables appear to be mostly consistent with findings in other studies, such as Milner and Tingley's (2010), with the exception of percent unemployed, which they find to be marginally significant and negative in predicting support for military aid and I find to be positive and highly significant. It is likely

that my somewhat different model specification (i.e. inclusion of gender, Democrat, and regional control variables in all models) is responsible for this difference.

Regarding hypothesis 2, I find that female legislators are no different from their male colleagues in their propensity to support economic aid, as indicated by the insignificant coefficients for high salience and low salience economic aid (Table 1) and for combined economic aid (Table 2). In all three models I find that both measures of ideology are statistically significant, though the directionality is somewhat confusing as it appears from the Democrat measure that democratic representatives are less likely to support economic aid while more liberal representatives are more likely to support it. It is likely that moderate democrats who vote against economic aid are driving these rather contradictory finding in part. Also, several of the district economic variables, including the measures of capital and manufacturing, as well as the percent black in a district are statistically significant indicators of a legislator's support for economic aid, consistent with findings in Milner and Tingley (2010).

In considering hypothesis 3, that female legislators will be more likely to support food aid, I look to the results in Table 2. I find no support for this hypothesis. Female legislators do not vote differently from their male colleagues on this issue. It appears that support for food aid is largely driven by ideology and presidential support for the bill. Surprisingly, the market value of agricultural products is not significant, a finding different from Milner and Tingley's (2010) study. I find a similar affect when comparing Democrat and DW-Nominate as I found when looking at economic aid. More liberal legislators tend to vote for more food aid, though Democrats are less likely to support these bills. As with economic aid, this difference may be the result of more conservative democrats voting against this aid, though additional work is necessary to better understand this relationship.

Table 1: Impact of Gender on Military and Economic Aid Votes, Controlling for Political Party, Ideology, District Economic and Social Factors, and Organized Economic Interest

	Military Aid b/se	High Salience Economic Aid b/se	Low Salience Economic Aid b/se
Female	-1.223** (0.397)	0.207 (0.311)	-0.173 (0.454)
Democrat	0.157 (0.306)	-2.566** (0.283)	-1.551** (0.425)
DW-Nominate	0.311 (0.492)	-10.041** (0.561)	-7.486** (0.767)
Presidential Support	1.272** (0.174)	0.472** (0.160)	1.103** (0.271)
% Vote for Republican Pres	3.975** (0.943)	-0.948 (0.979)	4.163** (1.129)
% High Skill	-5.082** (2.121)	19.429** (2.161)	3.675 (2.580)
Ln Capital	-0.383* (0.216)	0.954** (0.209)	1.470** (0.287)
Ln Manufacturing	0.363* (0.196)	-0.429** (0.208)	-1.130** (0.248)
% Unemployed	55.630** (4.165)	-0.542 (5.165)	-4.870 (6.316)
Avg 2-yr Change in Unemployment	0.001 (0.068)	-0.152** (0.064)	0.204* (0.122)
Ln Median Income	2.983** (0.628)	-1.994** (0.650)	-0.243 (0.892)
% Foreign Born	3.586** (1.440)	0.687 (1.913)	1.393 (2.754)
% Black	-0.223 (0.725)	3.366** (0.636)	1.468* (0.820)
West	-1.422** (0.245)	-0.267 (0.221)	-0.188 (0.298)
Mid-West	-0.324 (0.239)	0.570** (0.231)	0.133 (0.284)
South	1.541** (0.221)	-0.617** (0.224)	-0.951** (0.287)
Market Value Ag Products	22.870* (12.580)	8.267 (10.734)	-29.054** (14.329)
% Bank PAC Contributions	-0.421 (3.891)	19.681** (5.528)	3.675 (3.903)
% Corporate PAC Contributions	2.336** (0.599)	1.762** (0.497)	0.607 (0.442)
% Labor PAC Contributions	0.797 (0.572)	-0.572* (0.347)	0.128 (0.441)
constant	-37.124** (6.054)	12.135** (5.955)	-2.303 (8.152)
Observations	3126	3368	1083
Log-Likelihood	-1544.73	-933.75	-445.36

*p<.1 **p<.05

Table 2: Impact of Gender on Economic Aid and Food Aid Votes, Controlling for Political Party, Ideology, District Economic and Social Factors, and Organized Economic Interest

	Economic Aid b/se	Food Aid b/se
Female	0.131 (0.263)	1.115 (0.831)
Democrat	-2.111** (0.222)	-1.824** (0.603)
DW-Nominate	-9.002** (0.418)	-4.153** (0.943)
Presidential Support	0.421** (0.124)	2.680** (1.080)
% Vote for Republican Pres	0.358 (0.727)	-0.387 (1.704)
% High Skill	15.167** (1.673)	3.087 (4.839)
Ln Capital	1.119** (0.167)	0.147 (0.385)
Ln Manufacturing	-0.661** (0.163)	-0.368 (0.352)
% Unemployed	-2.803 (4.015)	-1.375 (9.920)
Avg 2-yr Change in Unemployment	-0.117** (0.050)	-0.087 (0.094)
Ln Median Income	-1.689** (0.537)	-1.139 (1.493)
% Foreign Born	-0.011 (1.595)	0.301 (2.514)
% Black	3.320** (0.476)	-0.447 (1.430)
West	-0.227 (0.178)	-0.422 (0.496)
Mid-West	0.456** (0.182)	-0.357 (0.412)
South	-0.777** (0.175)	-0.621 (0.500)
Market Value Ag Products	-3.615 (8.392)	42.023 (35.338)
% Bank PAC Contributions	11.585** (3.211)	-18.636** (4.777)
% Corporate PAC Contributions	1.354** (0.349)	1.019* (0.576)
% Labor PAC Contributions	-0.397 (0.265)	-1.106 (0.842)
constant	10.298** (4.866)	17.111 (14.230)
Observations	4451	645
Log-Likelihood	-1425.03	-198.70

*p<.1 **p<.05

Table 3: Predicted Probability¹ of Female Legislators' Support for Military Aid Compared to Male Legislators by Party

Political Party	Females' Likelihood of Supporting Military Aid Compared to Males' [95% Confidence Interval]
Democrats	-28.64% [-44.02%, -13.26%]
Republicans	-27.7% [-41.96%, -13.45%]

Note: All other variables held at mean/modal values.

It is quite possible that an interaction may exist between gender and political party. If an interaction effect does exist and I do not model it, I have misspecified my model and am introducing potential bias. As other scholars have found that gender and party may interact in representative roll-call voting decisions (Swers 1998; Frederick 2009), I therefore replicate the above models adding three binary variables measuring female Democrats, female Republicans, and male Democrats, with male Republicans as my base category. As illustrated in Tables 4 and 5, the interaction between political party and gender does make a difference for some of my models. In the model for military aid, only the coefficient for female democrat is statistically significant and negative, indicating that they are less likely to support aid than are republican male legislators. Female Republican legislators and male Democratic legislators do not vote differently than their male republican colleagues. This indicates that this model may not appropriately assess military aid voting. Regarding economic aid, however, including the interaction terms depict a different story.

¹ Predicted Probabilities generated using Clarify.

Table 4: Impact of Gender on Military and Economic Aid Votes, Controlling for Political Party, Gender*Party Interactions, Ideology, District Economic and Social Factors, and Organized Economic Interest

	Military Aid b/se	High Salience Economic Aid b/se	Low Salience Economic Aid b/se
Female Republican	-0.525 (0.503)	0.020 (0.506)	-1.772** (0.747)
Female Democrat	-1.503** (0.653)	-2.336** (0.462)	-0.783 (0.629)
Male Democrat	0.284 (0.313)	-2.650** (0.290)	-1.844** (0.443)
DW-Nominate	0.491 (0.500)	-10.172** (0.573)	-7.874** (0.803)
Presidential Support	1.253** (0.174)	0.467** (0.159)	1.167** (0.274)
% Vote for Republican Pres	3.920** (0.943)	-1.019 (0.980)	4.221** (1.155)
% High Skill	-4.906** (2.120)	18.914** (2.129)	3.833 (2.672)
Ln Capital	-0.430** (0.218)	0.965** (0.210)	1.597** (0.291)
Ln Manufacturing	0.380* (0.196)	-0.454** (0.207)	-1.217** (0.255)
% Unemployed	56.079** (4.145)	-1.141 (5.169)	-5.410 (6.412)
Avg 2-yr Change in Unemployment	0.001 (0.068)	-0.147** (0.063)	0.232* (0.123)
Ln Median Income	2.990** (0.627)	-1.878** (0.645)	-0.352 (0.888)
% Foreign Born	3.840** (1.475)	0.592 (1.945)	0.933 (2.850)
% Black	-0.239 (0.732)	3.397** (0.635)	1.484* (0.859)
West	-1.370** (0.245)	-0.290 (0.222)	-0.307 (0.303)
Mid-West	-0.268 (0.240)	0.518** (0.230)	-0.003 (0.286)
South	1.570** (0.223)	-0.635** (0.227)	-1.067** (0.293)
Market Value Ag Products	21.559* (12.432)	8.842 (11.051)	-23.169 (15.424)
% Bank PAC Contributions	-0.257 (3.893)	19.265** (5.484)	3.629 (3.886)
% Corporate PAC Contributions	2.320** (0.597)	1.793** (0.506)	0.562 (0.442)
% Labor PAC Contributions	0.846 (0.577)	-0.635* (0.347)	0.072 (0.440)
constant	-37.063** (6.044)	11.338* (5.930)	-1.273 (8.148)
Observations	3128	3373	1086
Log-Likelihood	-1543.67	-937.08	-441.48

*p<.1 **p<.05

Table 5: Impact of Gender on Economic Aid and Food Aid Votes, Controlling for Political Party, Gender*Party Interaction Ideology, District Economic and Social Factors, and Organized Economic Interest

	Economic Aid b/se	Food Aid b/se
Female Republican	-0.597 (0.429)	. .
Female Democrat	-1.585** (0.367)	-0.964 (0.996)
Male Democrat	-2.260** (0.229)	-1.791** (0.605)
DW-Nominate	-9.202** (0.431)	-4.143** (0.947)
Presidential Support	0.428** (0.123)	2.647** (1.093)
% Vote for Republican Pres	0.296 (0.727)	-0.364 (1.705)
% High Skill	15.069** (1.653)	3.080 (4.814)
Ln Capital	1.163** (0.167)	0.149 (0.386)
Ln Manufacturing	-0.692** (0.164)	-0.357 (0.352)
% Unemployed	-3.524 (4.033)	-1.074 (9.943)
Avg 2-yr Change in Unemployment	-0.114** (0.050)	-0.088 (0.094)
Ln Median Income	-1.706** (0.532)	-1.137 (1.496)
% Foreign Born	-0.336 (1.621)	0.329 (2.504)
% Black	3.336** (0.480)	-0.450 (1.426)
West	-0.274 (0.179)	-0.404 (0.495)
Mid-West	0.371** (0.181)	-0.356 (0.411)
South	-0.836** (0.177)	-0.590 (0.505)
Market Value Ag Products	-1.034 (8.779)	41.462 (35.517)
% Bank PAC Contributions	11.321** (3.200)	-18.572** (4.710)
% Corporate PAC Contributions	1.367** (0.354)	1.028* (0.575)
% Labor PAC Contributions	-0.462* (0.265)	-1.088 (0.845)
constant	10.606** (4.833)	16.892 (14.303)
Observations	4459	636
Log-Likelihood	-1427.31	-198.27

*p<.1 **p<.05

In the High Salience Economic Aid model (Table 4), we see that both male and female democratic legislators are less likely than republican males to vote in favor of this aid, though there is no statistical difference between male and female Republican representatives. Regarding Low Salience Economic Aid, we see that female Republicans and male Democrats are less likely to vote in favor of these bills, while Female democrats are not statistically different in their vote choices from republican males. Why this is the case is somewhat unclear as some would expect the largest difference to be between these two groups. Further exploration is necessary to better understand these findings. When the two aid categories are combined, I find a trend similar to the High Salience Economic Aid (Table 5).

When looking at food aid (Table 5), I find that Democratic male representatives are less likely to vote in favor of it than their Republican male colleagues, but no difference exists between female legislators and male Republican legislators. This is likely the result of the low number of observations this particular bill type and the small sample of female representatives. Overall, including this interaction does help to clarify the interaction between gender and party when it comes to voting for economic aid, namely that in this case party appears to trump gender.

Finally, returning to military aid, I conduct a preliminary analysis to determine whether female representatives, regardless of party, are more supportive of military aid after the 107th Congress. I compare roll call voting for military aid for the 96th-107th Congresses to voting in the 108th-110th Congresses. Looking at Table 6, while the coefficients for Female for both the 96th-107th and 108th-110th Congresses are negative and statistically significant, for the 108th-110th it is only marginally significant. Predicted probabilities paint a more illustrative picture. As indicated in Table 7, before the 108th Congress a very large gap existed between both male

and female democrats and male and female republicans. Since that time, the gap has shrunk considerably, and at the 95% confidence level, there is no difference in how male and female representatives from the same party vote regarding military aid. Somewhat surprisingly, democrats are more likely to vote in support of military aid from the 108th Congress on. Considering that the democrats made up a majority of the House during the 110th Congress, it could be that the majority of military aid bills that made it to a vote at that time were favorable to Democrats, and that is why we see such strong support Democratic support for military aid during this period. One must also keep in mind that these models provide a preliminary comparison between the two time periods, but additional controls should be added to paint a more complete picture of how gender affects voting.

Table 6: Impact of Gender and Party on Military Aid Voting.

	Military Aid 96th-107th b/se	Military Aid 108th-110th b/se
Female	-1.154** (0.245)	-0.224* (0.117)
Democrat	-0.711** (0.072)	1.151** (0.120)
Constant	0.777** (0.052)	1.208** (0.091)
Observations	3316	2239
Log-Likelihood	-2172.58	-945.07

*p<.1 **p<.05

Table 7: Predicted Probability of Voting in Favor of a Military Aid Bill

	96th-107th Congress			108th-110th Congress		
	Female	Male	Difference [95% Confidence Interval]	Female	Male	Difference [95% Confidence Interval]
Democrat	25.20%	51.66%	-26.46% [-35.59%, -17.33%]	89.42%	91.36%	-1.94% [-3.94%, 0.05%]
Republican	40.69%	68.51%	-27.83% [-39.37%, -16.28%]	72.78%	76.99%	-4.21% [-8.55%, 0.13%]

Conclusion

From these findings, it appears that gender differences in policy decisions do extend beyond domestic politics. Of the types of aid evaluated, however, these differences only seem to appear in voting on military aid. Consistent with previous findings, women are less likely to support military aid, as female legislators are less likely than their male colleagues to vote for military aid, even after controlling for ideology. This finding holds across ideology as well, with both liberal and conservative female legislators being less likely to support military aid than liberal and conservative male legislators respectively. It even holds across different levels of liberalness and conservativeness. This is significant in that it illustrates that this trend is not driven by only liberal or only conservative women. Female legislators across the political ideological spectrum are less likely to support military aid than their ideologically comparable male colleagues, indicating that a gender gap truly does exist.

Unlike previous findings in public opinion research, however, female legislators diverge from female survey respondents in that they are not less likely to support economic aid than are males. It could be that as elected officials, they must consider not only their own preferences but also the needs of their districts, especially concerning economic matters, making them different from the average female survey respondent. Additionally, roll-call votes are public record. Thus, legislators must strategically consider how those votes might affect their political careers. Where district economic factors are concerned, a female legislator may be persuaded to vote for bills that will be most economically beneficial to her district, or beneficial to certain groups within her district, and thus most beneficial to her reelection prospects, even if she herself does not personally support that bill.

Because of the types of aid categories employed in the analysis, it is difficult to reach a conclusion regarding whether females are more likely to support more altruistic or nurturing types of aid. Although the findings for military aid indicate that women do not support aid that could lead to violence and intergroup conflict, future studies that disaggregate aid votes even further to better capture voting on humanitarian or development aid will help clarify whether female legislators are more likely to support more altruistically motivated aid than their male counterparts. Another consideration one must make in evaluating this study is that roll-call voting only scratches the surface of potential gender differences in legislative participation. It does not reveal how committed a legislator is to a particular issue, or what role the legislator played in advancing a bill through the legislative process. Thus, future research evaluating the impact of gender on foreign aid decisions should not only consider votes on types of foreign aid, but also a legislator's involvement in the processes that produce that legislation to begin with.

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