POLITY II: POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND RECIME CHANGE. 1800-1986

(ICPSR 9263)

Principal Investigator

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* Note that this document is not the original POLITY II codebook, of which a printed version is available from ICPSR (no electronic copy is available). The POLITY II codebook contains important information not included in the documentation for later updates of the POLITY database. This document reports the relevant information from the POLITY II codebook, omitting the documentation of variables not included in the POLITY III data. With the permission of Ted R. Gurr, Keith Jaggers, and Will H. Moore, this version has been scanned and very lightly edited for electronic posting and archival purposes.

More specifically, this document does not contain the following items from the original POLITY II codebook. 1) Tables mapping the translation of concepts from POLITY I to POLITY II. 2) Table 2.4.1 (also referred to as Table 2.5 in the original text) and table 2.6. 3) Sections 7 (Institutional Adaptability and Persistence), 8 (Central Government Expenditures, Revenues & National Accounts), and 9 (Banks' Polity Characteristics). These variables are not included in either POLITY III or POLITY IIID. 4) Appendices A and B listing country codes and data coverage and codes for missing and inappropriate data. More recent information on this is provided in the POLITY III and POLITY IIID documentation.

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[Note: This document was produced by scanning the printed POLITY II manual. It is provided as is" and may contain errors. Errors may be reported to ksg@isere.colorado.edu. All questions concerning the POLITY data should be directed to the principal investigator Keith Jaggers, kcjaggers@aol.com.]

DATA COLLECTION DESCRIPTION

Ted Robert Gurr POLITY II: POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND RECIME CHANCE9 1800-1986 (ICPSR 9263)

SUMMARY: Carried out under the auspices of the Data Development for International Research (DDIR) project, POLITY II was designed to develop longitudinal indicators of political structures and regime change. This file encompasses most member states of the international system from 1800 to 1986, and consists of annual codings of regimes' structural characteristics, institutional changes, and the directionality of changes on underlying dimensions of democracy, autocracy, and power concentrations CLASS IV

UNIVERSE: Annual observations from 1800 to 1986 of 20 historical countries and 132 contemporary countries encompassing virtually all independent countries with populations of one million or more in the 1980S.

NOTE: This collection succeeds an earlier study by the principal investigator and Erica Gurr titled POLITY DATA: PERSISTENCE AND CHANGE IN POLITICAL SYSTEMS, 1980-1971 (ICPSR 5010). Each case represents a country-year observation. The data contain blanks and other nonnumeric codes.

RESTRICTIONS: Copies of pre-publication papers using the POLITY II dataset should be sent to the authors of the related publication cited below.

EXTENT OF COLLECTION: 1 data file

DATA FORMAT: Card Image and SPSSX EXPORT file

Part 1: Card Image File Part 2: SPSSX EXPORT File

File Structure: rectangular Cases: 12,459
Cases: 12,459
Record Length: 80

Variables: 54 Record Length: 80 Records Per Case: 4

[Note that the data on the web site http://www.colorado.edu/IBS/GAD/Spacetime/Data/Polity.html is provided in a different format, documented on that site.]

RELATED PUBLICATIONS:

Gurr, Ted R., Keith Jaggers, and Will H. Moore. "The Transformation of the Western State: The Growth of Democracy, Autocracy, and State Power since 1800." STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 25 (Spring) 73—108.

POLITY II CODEBOOK (July 6, 1989)

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Scanned Thursday, December 11, 1997

I. OVERVIEW OF POLITY II PROJECT

Carried out under the auspices of the Data Development for International Research (DDIR) project, the objective of the POLITY II study was to develop longitudinal indicators of political structures and regime change. Encompassing most member states of the international system from 1800 to 1986, this dataset consists of annual codings of regimes' structural characteristics, institutional changes, and the directionality of changes on underlying dimensions of democracy, autocracy, and power concentration.

The present study builds on the first author's earlier study of "Persistence and Change in Political Systems 1800-1971," which used a more restricted dataset of the same kind to determine which authority traits characterized the more durable political systems, in different regions and in different historical periods (Gurr, 1974). In the POLIW I study the unit of analysis was the "polity" or political structure, each of which was described in terms of six dimensions of authority patterns. When a polity was transformed by an abrupt, major change on one or more of these authority characteristics, we treated the change as the termination of the old polity and the establishment of a new one. The dependent variables in the analysis were the persistence and adaptability of each historical and contemporary polity. The of persistence was the number of years a polity endured without abrupt, major change; adaptability was the number of minor and gradual changes in a polity's authority traits during its lifespan. We found, not surprisingly, that the most durable polities were ones that had undergone a number of minor or gradual changes in authority characteristics. Another significant finding was that polities which had internally consistent ("coherent") democratic or autocratic traits tended to be more durable than polities characterized by mixed authority traits. Only in Europe, however, were democratic regimes significantly more durable than autocracies. Among historical polities-those no longer functioning in 1971—the relationship was reversed: autocracies had been more durable than democracies.

Some of these findings were confirmed, others qualified in subsequent reanalyses of the POLITY I data by Ward (1974). Harmel (1980), Lichbach (1984), and Thiessen and Bays (1986) - Harmel found that when he employed more restrictive definitions of abrupt polity change, democracies proved to have been more persistent and adaptable than autocracies, historically and in most regions as well as the contemporary world. Whereas the other analyses were cross-sectional and cross-regional, Lichbach was concerned with sequences of political change in 49 historical and contemporary European states. He found no evidence that European states as a group followed similar patterns of change over time with respect to any one authority trait. He did find, however, that "Incoherent polities tended, eventually, to become coherent. Coherent polities tended to that way, That is, incoherent polities were short-lived experiments while coherent polities were longer-lived systems" (Lichbach 1984: 137). In other words there was no common, unidirectional movement in European societies toward coherent democracies. Rather, there was a century-long process of political experimentation in which the surviving polities gradually bifurcated into two sharply distinct groups: coherent democracies and coherent autocracies.

It was difficult to use the original polity dataset for longitudinal analyses because of its structure: each polity's authority pattern was profiled only twice, one at its inception and once at its termination. Beginning in 1986 we began to work on a new dataset, POLITY II, in which authority traits are coded annually. This has required more thorough screening of historical sources to identify and code minor changes in authority traits. At the time the dataset has been updated to 1986 and a number of additional countries added. As presently constituted, the dataset encompasses 132 contemporary countries, including virtually all of those whose present population approaches or exceeds one million. The long established members of the international system are coded beginning in 1800. More recently-established countries are coded for the year in which their first independent government was formed-usually the year of independence, sometimes a few years earlier or later. The polities of 20 historical Eurasian countries also are included that is, countries like the Ottoman Empire, Bavaria, and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, which once enjoyed independence but subsequently broke up or were absorbed by others.

The POLITY II dataset also incorporates some conceptual changes. Nine authority traits, identified below, are coded for each polity in contrast with the six traits coded in POLITY I. And more precise operational guidelines have been devised for coding institutional developments during periods of transition from one authority pattern to another.

The authority traits in the POLITY II dataset for 152 countries can be analyzed in alternative ways. Each of the dimensions of authority can be examined separately, a procedure Lichbach (1984) followed using the POLITY I dataset to study historical sequences of political development in Europe, Alternatively, these indicators are amendable to creating composite scores. In our initial analysis of POLITY II we have constructed three composite indicators of general properties of political systems: racy, autocracy, and the centralization of power (Gurr, Jaggers and Moore, 1988). These indicators, coded annually, are included in the POLITY II dataset.

The POLITY II dataset also incorporates 14 variables from Arthur S . Banks' 1986 version of the Cross-Polity Time-Series dataset, document a variety regime characteristics. Moreover, fiscal and national accounts data are also included in the dataset to enable researchers to perform longitudinal and/or cross-sectional analyses of the changes in government involvement in national economic activity. The three main variables are government expenditures, government revenues, and national accounts.

II. INDEX TO VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THE POLITY II DATASE[‡]

Nine groups of variables are included in the POLITY II dataset. They are listed here and described in detail below,

(1) SPATIAL-TEMPORAL DOMAIN

1.1 YEAR: Year

1.2 CCODE: Country Code

1.3 CONTRYEAR: Country Code and Year

(2) BASIC AUTHORITY CHARACTERISTICS OF POLITIES

2.1 XRREG: Regulation of Executive Recruitment
2.2 XRCOMP: Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment

2.3 XROPEN: Openness of Executive Recruitment

2.4 MONO: Monocratism

2.5 XCONST: Executive Constraints

2.6 PARREG: Regulation of Political Anticipation
2.7 PARCCMP: Competitiveness of Political Participation
2.8 CENT: Centralization of Political Authority

(3) IDENTIFICATION OF MAJOR, ABRUPT POLITY CHANGE

3.1 CHANGE: Polity Change

(4) EVENTS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING/CAUSING POLITY TERMINATION

4.1 TERM1: Old Polity, Loss of Autonomy
4.2 TERM2: Old Polity, External Conflict
4.3 TERM3: Old Polity, Domestic Violence
4.4 TERM4: Old Polity, No Domestic Violence

(5) EVENTS SIGNIFYING POLITYU FORMATION

5.1 ORIG1: New Nation, Polity Origin
5.2 ORIG2: New Nation, Polity Birth
5.3 ORIG3: Old Nation, External Conflict
5.4 ORIG4: Old Nation, Domestic Violence
5.5 ORIG5: Old Nation, No Domestic Violence

5.6 MODEL: Model for New Nation

[‡] Variables are listed using the alphanumerical labels that appear on the tape. Variable formats are given in parentheses.

(6) <u>INDICATORS OF DEMOCRACY</u>, <u>AUTOCRACY AND STATE POWER</u>

6.1 AUTOC: Institutionalized Autocracy
6.2 DEMOC: Institutionalized Democracy

6.3 CONCEN: Power Concentration

6.4 COHER: Coherence of Political Institutions

APPENDIX: WORKS CITED

III. DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES AND CODING PROCEDURES

1. SPATIAL-TEMPORAL DOMAIN

The POLITY II study includes all independent members of the international system, as defined in the Correlates of War project, with some modifications. (1) For inclusion states must have achieved independence by 1975 and have a population greater than 1,000,000 in the 1980s. (2) Authority characteristics (variables 2.1-2.9) are coded annually beginning in 1800, for states that were then independent (even if they were not yet members of the international system, as defined in the COW project), or from the year in which the state first gained effective autonomy (which in some cases is earlier than the year in which system membership begins). Coding ceases when a state is occupied or absorbed by another and resumes if a state regains its independence. (3) Fiscal and national accounts estimates (variables S. 1-8. 10) are coded, insofar as they are available, during the period of as defined above. They are not recorded for periods of colonial rule or foreign occupation.

A complete list of states, country codes, and the time-spans for which each group of variables is coded is provided in Appendix A.

1.1 YEAR

A four digit code is used.

1.2 COUNTRY CODE

Each country in the POLITY II dataset is defined by a three-digit numeric code, derived from the Correlates of War's listing of nation members of the interstate system, 1816-1986.

1.3 COUNTRY YEAR

A unique identifier for each country year, consisting of the country followed by the year. This variable was created to facilitate merging.

2. BASIC AUTHORITY CHARACTERISTICS OF POLITIES

The conceptual framework for the polity studies was derived from Harry Eckstein's analytic scheme for describing patterns of authority. The scheme was designed "to apply to authority patterns in any and all social units, regardless of variations ... and regardless of whether the units exhibit great or little overall asymmetry between superordinates and subordinates" (Eckstein and Gurr 1975, p.41). It identifies six different clusters of dimensions on which authority patterns vary, including four dimensions of influence relations between superordinate and subordinate strata (Directiveness, Participation, Responsiveness, and Compliance); two dimensions of inequality between these strata (Distance and Deportment); three dimensions characterizing relations among superordinates (Conformation, Decision-Rules, and Decision-Behavior); the Competitiveness of recruitment to superordinate positions; and the Bases of legitimacy, whether personal, substantive or procedural. A number of these dimensions consist of several subdimensions. The polarities of each dimension are identified, along with intervening categories on them.

This complex scheme permits far more detailed analysis and more subtle distinctions among authority patterns than does a simple democratic-autocratic continuum. On the other hand, only some of its distinctions are relevant to our understanding of differences among political systems, and not all of these can be assessed operationally over the long historical run. Consequently the POLITY II project focuses on nine operational indicators of political authority patterns, with special attention to the Influence dimensions, the Recruitment of chief executive, and aspects of Conformation, i.e., governmental structure.

Using multiple historical sources for each country, along with reference to a variety of sources, the nine operational indicators of authority characteristics were elaborated into a series of ordinal scales. These scales are interpreted below. First, a brief discussion on the standardized codes used across all of these variables is in order.

A score of "88" in variables 2.1-2.9 indicates a period of transition. Some new polities are preceded by a "transition period" during which new institutions are planned, legally constituted, and put into effect. Democratic and quasi-democratic polities are particularly likely to be so established, in a procedure involving constitutional conventions and referenda. During this period of transition, all authority characteristic indicators are scored "88". Two examples:

- (1) In Argentina, after 6 years of state terrorism, economic decline and, finally, the humiliating defeat in the Falklands war, the military junta was dissolved in June 1982. Headed by retired General Bignone, the interim government established a dialogue with the major political parties and promised to hold elections in October 1983. Competitive elections were held in October and Raul Alfonsin was inaugurated in December 1983. The transitional period is the period from June, 1982, through October, 1983. However, operationally, only 1982 is coded as the transition period. Constrained by our use of an annual time-series format, transition periods are only coded if the new polity is formally established in a different year than that of the previous polity's demise. An "88" is entered in the year of the polity's demise rather than the year of its origin, regardless of the month in which either event occurred.
- (2) Cuba, in the immediate post-revolution years, demonstrates that an individual's attempt to consolidate power can also result in periods of transition, In January 1959 Fidel Castro and his rebel troops captured Santa Clara, Santiago and Havana, forcing Batista to resign and flee the country. Manuel Urrutia was named provisional president by Castro shortly thereafter. It was not until December 1961 that Castro declared himself a Marxist-Leninist and announced the formation of a unified party to bring Communism to Cuba. Thus, 1959 and 1960 are coded as transitional years.

When using the "88" code, the question of <u>whether</u> a new polity has been formed must be decided before dealing with the question of <u>when</u>. The criteria for operationally determining a "polity change" are discussed below.

A score of "66" in variables 2.1-2.9 represents a period of "interruption". Operationally, if a country is occupied by foreign powers during wartime, terminating the old polity, then reestablishes a polity after foreign occupation ends, we code the intervening years as an interruption if the pre-war polity is reestablished. However, if the post-war polity is fundamentally different from the pre-war polity then we code this as an interregnum ("77"). Periods of interruption are also coded for the participants involved in short-lived attempts at the creation of ethnic, religious, or regional federations. During periods of interruption <u>all</u> authority characteristic indicators are "66".

"77" in variables 2.1-2.9 indicates periods of interregnum, during which there is a complete collapse of central political authority. This is most likely to during periods of internal war. Lebanon between 1978 and 1986-in which internal factionalism, civil war, and external military intervention has at times reduced the scope of the regime's central authority to a few square blocks of Beirut-is a recent example of an interregnum. During an interregnal period, all variables of authority characteristics are coded "77". Moreover, like the "88" and "66" codes, a "77" is entered for the year in which the interregnum began, regardless of the month of its origin, and for each year prior to the year in which central authority is regained or a new polity is established. Two caveats are associated with the "77" code:

- (1) If the interregnum period results in the formation of a new polity, and it is less than a year, the period is usually incorporated without separate mention in the "transition period" of the next polity.
- (2) If a country is occupied by foreign powers during wartime, terminating the old polity, then reestablishes a polity after foreign occupation ends, the intervening years are coded as an interregnum if a "new" polity is established.

For variables 2.1-2.9, missing data is denoted by "99".

Before discussing these variables in detail, a brief word on the reliability of the authority dimensions is in order. The reliability of the indicators developed here depends on the accuracy and consistency of the coding of the constituent authority variables, The POLITY I data were collected in the mid-1970s by a single coder, Erika B. K. Gurr, who worked with increasingly refined versions of category definitions and coding guidelines. On three occasions all information gathered to date was reviewed and recoded by the coder, in consultation with the first author, to ensure its consistency with revised guidelines. Multiple historical sources were used for each country, along with reference to a variety of standard sources. The first step was to identify historical and social science works for each country, then to compile from them a basic political chronology. Periods of substantial change were identified in this process and then examined in detail to determine whether events met the specified criteria for changes in and of polities. The same provided information for the coding of authority characteristics.

The POLITY I Codebook, dataset, and narrative summaries of the political chronologies for each polity, with source lists, were deposited with and subsequently distributed by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (Gurr and Associates, 1978). The reliability of authority codings have been taken as a given by most of the investigators who have used them in s analyses. The principle exception is Lichbach (1984), who detected some ambiguities about the timing of minor changes in authority traits when converting the European codings to time-series form. He resolved them by further reading in historical sources. The construction of POLITY II was begun by Mark Lichbach, who converted the remaining POLITY I codings to annual data, and completed by Keith Jaggers, who recoded and extended the dataset using a wide variety of historical and contemporary source materials. The first author reviewed much of the coding, with special attention to questions of consistency, and (re)coded Directiveness for all polities. The POLITY II coding guidelines were amplified and refined in the process.

No intercoder reliability tests have been carried out. We are reasonably confident that the coding guidelines have been applied consistently, because they were developed and used by four people who worked with them intensively and over a long period of time. The fact that coding was done by four individual also lends confidence that the judgments do not reflect the idiosyncratic interpretations of one individual-and if they do, the idiosyncrasies are explicit in the guidelines and thus subject to revision by other scholars.

The related question is whether the sources examined prior to coding were sufficiently complete and accurate. This is a potential threat to the reliability and validity of the codings for some minor European and Latin American states during the nineteenth century for which source materials are scarce. Accurate coding of Executive Constraint, for example, requires political analyses with a depth not often include in summary histories, A few of the predecessor states of Imperial Germany that nominally qualify for inclusion in POLITY I and II were not coded for lack of adequate English-language sources.

EXECUTIVE RECRUITMENT (vars. 2.1 to 2.3)

According to Eckstein and Gurr,

Executive recruitment involves the ways in which superordinates come to their positions ... In current sociological jargon this is a species of "boundary interchange," a matter of crossing lines bet superordinate and subordinate positions (Eckstein and Gurr 1975:150).

The POLITY II dataset contains three indicators of the structural characteristics by which chief executives are recruited: (1) the extent of institutionalization of executive transfers, (2) the competitiveness of executive selection, and (3) the openness of executive recruitment.

2.1 XRREG: Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment

In considering Recruitment, we must first decide whether there are any established modes at all by which chief executives are selected. Regulation refers to the extent to which a polity has institutionalized procedures for transferring executive power. Three categories are used to differentiate the extent of institutionalization:

(1) <u>Unregulated:</u> Changes in chief executive occur through forceful seizures of power. Such caesaristic transfers of power are sometimes legitimized after the fact in noncompetitive elections or by legislative

enactment. Despite these "legitimization" techniques, a polity remains unregulated until the de facto leader of the coup has been replaced as head of government either by designative or competitive modes of executive selection. However, unregulated recruitment does not include the occasional forceful ouster of a chief executive if elections are called within a reasonable time and the previous pattern continues.

- (2) <u>Designational/transitional</u>: Chief executives are chosen by designation within the political elite, without formal competition (i.e., one-party systems or "rigged" multiparty elections). Also here are transitional arrangements intended to regularize future power transitions after an initial unregulated seizure of power (i.e., after constitutional legitimization of military rule or during periods when the leader of the coup steps down as head of state but retains unrivaled power within the political <u>realm</u> as head of the military). Ibis category also includes polities in transition from designative to elective modes of executive selection (i.e., the period of "guided democracy" often exhibited during the transition from military to civilian rule) or vice versa (i.e., regimes ensuring electoral victory through the intimidation of oppositional leaders or the promulgation of a "state of emergency" before executive elections).
- (3) <u>Regulated</u>: Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession or in competitive elections. Ascriptive/designative and ascriptive/elective selections (i.e., an effective king and premier) are also coded as regulated. The fundamental difference between regulated selection and unregulated recruitment is that regulated structures require the existence of institutionalized modes of executive recruitment either through constitutional decree or lineage. Moreover, in regulated competitive elections, unlike the designational/transitional mode, the method of future executive selection is not dependent on the particular party or regime currently holding power.

2.2 XRCOMP: Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment

Competitiveness refers to "the extent that prevailing modes of advancement give subordinates equal opportunities to become superordinates (Gurr, 1974:1483)." For example, selection of chief executives through elections matching two or more viable parties or candidates is regarded as competitive. If power transfers are coded Unregulated ("1") in the Regulation of Executive Recruitment (variable 2.1), or involve a transition to/from unregulated, Competitiveness is 00. Three categories are used to measure this concept:

- (1) <u>Selection</u>: Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, designation, or by a combination of both, as in countries whose chief minister is chosen by king or court. Examples of pure designative selection are rigged, unopposed elections; repeated replacement of presidents before their terms end; recurrent military selection of civilian executives; selection within an institutionalized single party; recurrent incumbent selection of successors; repeated election boycotts by the major opposition parties, etc.
- (2) <u>Dual/Transitional</u>: Dual executives in which one is chosen by hereditary succession, the other by competitive election. Also used for transitional arrangements between selection (ascription and/or designation) and competitive election.
- (3) <u>Election</u>: Chief executives are typically chosen in or through competitive elections matching to or more major parties or candidates. (Elections may be popular or by an elected assembly.)

2.3 XROPEN: Openness of Executive Recruitment

Recruitment of the chief executive is "Open" to the extent that all the politically active population has an opportunity, in principle, to attain the position through a regularized process. If power transfers are coded Unregulated (1) in the Regulation of Executive Recruitment (variable 2.1), or involve a transition to/from Unregulated, Openness is coded 00. Four categories are used:

(1) <u>Closed:</u> Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, e.g. kings, emperors, beys, emirs, etc, who as executive powers by right of descent. An executive selected by other means may proclaim

himself a monarch but the polity he governs is not coded "closed" unless a relative actually succeeds him as ruler.

- (2) <u>Dual Executive -- Designation:</u> Hereditary succession plus executive or court selection of an effective chief minister.
- (3) <u>Dual Executive -- Election:</u> Hereditary succession plus electoral selection of an effective chief minister,
- (4) <u>Open:</u> Chief executives are chosen by elite designation, competitive election, or transitional arrangements between designation and election.

Some examples may clarify the coding scheme outlined above, The Soviet Union's profile on these variables, since the accession of Krushchev, is Designational/Selection/Open. Victorian Britain's profile was Regulated /Transitional/Dual Executive:Election, whereas contemporary Britain, along with other modern democracies is coded Regulated/Election/Open. The Polities of leaders who seize power by force are coded Unregulated, but there is a recurring impulse among such leaders to regularize the process of succession, usually by relying on some form of selection. A less common variant, as in modern Iran and Nicaragua under the Somozas, is one in which a Caesaristic leader attempts to establish the principle of hereditary succession. We code all such attempts at regularizing succession as Transitional (under Regulation, variable 2.1) until the first chief executive chosen under the new rules takes office.

RESPONSIVESS: THE INDEPENDENCE OF EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY

One of the key characteristics of authority patterns is the extent to which the head of the unit (in states, the chief executive ruler) must take into account the preferences of others when making decisions. According to Eckstein and Gurr:

There is an important qualitative difference in Responsiveness that is analogous to the distinction between sufferance and suffrage. In some authority patterns the supers are obliged to incorporate some preferences of subordinates into decisions, in others they need only consider them. Most ruling Communist parties follow the latter pattern: there are regular (even if limited) opportunities for party members to express their views on matters of party policy, but ordinary members seldom are empowered to make choices among alternative policies. Most political parties in Western democracies, and some labor unions, have institutionalized the provision of choice for at least some kinds of policies (Eckstein and Gurr, 1975:381).

The POLITY II dataset incorporates two relevant characteristics of Responsiveness: (1) the extent to which the chief executive is dependent either formally or informally for his position on a cabinet, council or junta, and (2) the magnitude to which decision rules constrain the executives actions.

2.4 MONO: Monocratism

According to Eckstein and Gurr, the independence of the chief executive can be dissected into a single, fundamental dichotomy:

The simplest and sharpest distinction we can make is between patterns in which monocratic (one-man) rule prevails and those in which some kind of assent is required, whether by especially prestigious minorities of supers, numerical majorities, or virtually all of them. We label the latter "concurrent" patterns, to distinguish them as a group from "monocratic" ones (Eckstein and Gurr, 1975:375).

Operationally, POLITY II focuses on the structural character distinguishing between pure individual and collective executives and specifying three intermediate categories.

(1) <u>Pure Individual Executive</u>: The executive is a single individual, not dependent either formally or informally for his position or authority on a cabinet, council or junta. An executive who is a "front man" for

a strong man" behind the scenes is also coded here. Monarchs are almost always "pure individual executives"; presidents and dictators usually are. Premiers and generals-as-executives am usually dependent, at least formally, on cabinets, councils, or juntas; if so their polities are coded 2 or 3, depending on the extent of dependence, below.

(2) Intermediate Category

(3) <u>Qualified Individual Executive</u>: The executive is formally a cabinet, supreme council, or junta, but one member is first among equals" and holds substantially more effective authority than the other members. Most parliamentary, junta, and Communist regimes are of this sort.

(4) Intermediate Category

- (5) <u>Collective Executive</u>: The executive is formally and effectively a committee, supreme council, or junta. It may have a chairman, but no one individual or position clearly dominates it. "Permanent" collective executives (coded here) must be distinguished from "temporary" ones (coded under 1-4, above). The general rule is that collective executives whose members proclaim themselves as temporary, and who rule collectively only until the election, or emergence, of an individual executive, are "temporary." The following operational rules were followed:
 - i. If a new constitution or similar document is issued which institutionalizes the collective executive, it is "permanent", however long it lasts.
 - ii. If a collective body rules during an emergency such as war or civil war but afterwards gives way to an individual executive, it is "temporary".
 - iii. If a collective body changes its chairman without a dominant individual executive emerging, it is "permanent."
 - iv. If a collective body rules for more than two years but without any of the above kinds of evidence about whether it is "transitional" to an individual-executive pattern, it is "permanent."
- Note 2.1: If a polity is coded on variable 2.3 as having a dual executive (codes 2 or 3), the Monocratism variable is coded as either Qualified individual (3), (4), or Collective executive (5), depending on whether one member of the executive team exercises Predominant authority. If authority fluctuates between them over time, it is coded as Qualified individual (3).
- Note 2.2: In a one-party Communist state, if one person regularly holds both the Party chairmanship and chairmanship of the supreme executive organ -Council of State, Presidium, etc. it is coded as Pure individual executive (1). If the two posts are regularly held by two persons, it is coded as Qualified individual (3).

2.5 XCONST: Executive Constraints (Decision Rules)

According to Eckstein and Gurr, decision rules are defined in the following manner:

Superordinate structures in action make decisions concerning the direction of social units. Making such decisions requires that supers and subs be able to recognize when decision-processes have been concluded, especially properly" concluded. An indispensable ingredient of the processes, therefore, is the existence of Decision Rules that provide basic criteria under which decisions are considered to have been taken (Eckstein and Gurr, 1975:121),

Operationally, this variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Such limitations may be imposed by any "accountability groups," In Western democracies these are usually legislatures. Other kinds of accountability, groups are the ruling

party in a one-party state; councils of nobles or powerful advisors in monarchies; the military in coup-prone polities; and in many states a strong, independent judiciary. The concern is therefore with the checks and balances bet the various parts of the decision-making process. A seven-category scale is used.

- (1) <u>Unlimited Authority:</u> There are no regular limitations on the executive's actions (as distinct from irregular limitations such as the threat or actuality of coups and assassinations). Examples of evidence:
 - i. Constitutional restrictions on executive action are ignored.
 - ii. Constitution is frequently revised or suspended at the executive's initiative.
 - iii. There is no legislative assembly, <u>or</u> there is one but it is called and dismissed at the executive's pleasure.
 - iv. The executive appoints a majority of members of any accountability group and can remove them at will.
 - v. The legislature cannot initiate legislation or veto or suspend acts of the executive.
 - vi. Rule by decree is repeatedly used.

Note 2.3: If the executive is given limited or unlimited power by a legislature to cope with an emergency and relents this power after the emergency has passed, this is not a <u>change</u> to unlimited authority.

(2) Intermediate Category

(3) Slight to Moderate Limitations on Executive Authority:

There are some real but limited restraints on the executive, Evidence:

- i. The legislature initiates some categories of legislation.
- ii. The legislature delays implementation of executive acts and decrees.
- iii. The executive fails to change some constitutional restrictions, such as prohibitions on succeeding himself, or extending his term.
- iv. The ruling or party initiates some legislation or takes some administrative action independently of the executive.
- v. The legislature or party approves some categories of appointments nominated by the executive.
- vi. There is an independent judiciary,
- vii. Situations in which there exists a civilian executive, but in which policy decisions, for all practical purposes, reflect the demands of the military.

(4) Intermediate category

- (5) <u>Substantial Limitations on Executive Authority:</u> The executive has more effective authority than any accountability group but is subject to substantial constraints by them. Examples:
 - i. A legislature, ruling party or council often modifies or defeats executive proposals for action.

- ii. A council or legislature sometimes refuses funds to the executive.
- iii. The accountability group makes important appointments to administrative posts.
- iv. The legislature refuses the executive permission to leave the country.

(6) Intermediate Category

- (7) <u>Executive Parity or Subordination</u>: Accountability have effective authority equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity. Examples of evidence:
 - i. A legislature, ruling party, or council of nobles initiates much or most important legislation.
 - ii. The executive (President, premier, king, cabinet, council) is chosen by the accountability group <u>and</u> is dependent on its continued support to remain in office (as in most parliamentary systems).
 - iii. In multi-party democracies there is chronic "cabinet instability."

EXTENT OF POLITICAL COMPETITION AND OPPOSITION (vars. 2.6, 2.7)

A third general authority trait of polities is participation. As Eckstein and Gurr defined participation, it involves the following:

Subordinates need not be merely passive recipients of direction, and they seldom are. Some of them generally attempt to influence the directive activities of supers. Acts by which subs attempt to wield such influence are acts of participation (Eckstein and Gurr, 1975:60).

The operational question is the extent to which the political system enables non-elites to influence political elites in regular ways, The POLITY II dataset measures this concept in two ways: (1) by the degree of institutionalization or "regulation" of political participation, and (2) by the extent of government restriction on political competition.

2,6 PARREG: The Regulation of Participation

Participation is regulated to the extent that there are binding rules on when, whether, and how political preferences are expressed. One-party states and Western democracies both regulate participation but they do so in different ways, the former by channeling participation through a single party structure, with sharp limits on diversity of opinion; the latter by allowing relatively stable and enduring groups to compete nonviolently for political influence. The polar opposite is unregulated participation, in which there are no enduring national political organizations and no effective regime controls on political activity. In such situations political competition is fluid and usually characterized by recurring violent conflict among shifting coalitions of partisan groups, A five-category scale is used to code this dimension:

- (1) <u>Unregulated Participation:</u> Political participation is fluid; there are no enduring national political organizations and no systematic regime controls on political activity. Political groupings tend to form around particular leaders, regional interests, religious or ethnic or clan groups, etc.; but the number and relative importance of such groups in national political life varies substantially over time, "Unregulated participation" may or may not be characterized by violent conflict among partisan groups.
- (2) <u>Factional or Transitional:</u> There are relatively stable and enduring political groups which compete for political influence at the national level parties, regional groups, or "factions, " not necessarily elected but competition among them is intense, hostile, and frequently violent. Extreme factionalism may be manifested in the establishment of rival governments and in civil war. This coding is also used to

characterize transitions to/from uninstitutionalized participation and between factional and institutionalized participation.

- (3) <u>Factional/Restricted</u>: Polities which oscillate more or less regularly between intense factionalism and restriction: when one group secures power it restricts its opponents' political activities until it is displaced in turn. Also coded here are polities in which political are factional but policies of genocide or politicide are routinely carried out against significant portions of the population that historically have been excluded from positions of political power (for example, Indians in some South American tries). Transitions between factional/restricted and Regulated Participation, as well as shifts among Factional/Restricted and Restricted modes of behavior are coded here.
- (4) <u>Restricted:</u> Some organized Political participation is permitted without intense factionalism but significant group, issues and/or types of conventional participation are regularly excluded from the political process.
- (5) <u>Regulated:</u> Relatively stable and enduring political groups regularly compete for political influence and positions with little use of coercion. No significant groups, issues, or types of conventional political action are regularly excluded from the political process.

2.7 PARCOMP: The Competitiveness of Participation

The competitiveness of participation refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be in the political arena. Political competition implies a significant degree of civil interaction, so polities which are coded Unregulated (1) on Regulation of Participation (variable 2.6) are not coded for competitiveness. Polities in transition between Unregulated and any of the regulated forms on variable 2.6 also are not on variable 2.7. Competitiveness is on a five-category scale:

- (1) <u>Suppressed Competition:</u> No significant oppositional activity outside the ranks of the regime and ruling party. Totalitarian party systems, authoritarian military dictatorships, and tic monarchies are typically coded here. However, the mere existence of these structures is not sufficient for a coding. The regime's institutional structure must also be matched by its demonstrated ability to suppress oppositional competition.
- (2) Restricted/Transitional: Some organized, political competition occurs outside government, without serious factionalism; but the regime systematically and sharply limits its form, extent, or both in ways that exclude substantial groups (20% or more of the male adult population) from participation. "Restricted Competition" is distinguished from "Factional Competition" (3 below) by the systematic2 persisting nature of the restrictions: large cases of people, groups, or types of peaceful political competition are continuously excluded from the political process. As an operational rule, the banning of a political party which received more than 10% of the vote in a recent national election is sufficient evidence that competition is "restricted." However, other information is required to determine whether the appropriate coding is (2) Restricted or (3) Factional Competition. This category is also used to characterize transitions between Factional and Suppressed or Restricted competition. Examples of "restricted" limitations are:
 - i. Prohibiting some kinds of political organizations either by type or group of people involved (e.g.,neither national political parties nor political organizations among blacks).
 - ii. Prohibiting some kinds of political action (e.g., Communist parties may organize but are prohibited from competing in elections).
 - iii. Systematic harassment of political opposition (leaders killed, jailed, or sent into exile; candidates regularly ruled off ballots; opposition media -- press, radio stations --, etc,). This is evidence for either "Factional" or "Restricted," depending on its persistence.

Note 2.4: A newly enacted right to engage in political activities is most likely a change from category 1 to 2.

- (3) Factional Competition: Polities with factional or factional/restricted patterns of competition.
- (4) <u>Transitional competition:</u> Any transitional elements from Restricted, or Factional patterns to fully Competitive patterns, or vice versa. Transitions to competitive are not complete until a national election is held on a fully competitive basis.
- (5) <u>Competitive Competition</u>: There are relatively stable and enduring political groups which regularly compete for political influence at the national level. Competition among them seldom causes widespread violence or disruption. Very small parties or political groups may be restricted in the "Competitive" pattern.
- (00) <u>Not Applicable:</u> This is used for polities that are coded as Unregulated, or moving to/from that position, in Regulation of Political participation (variable 2.6).

By combining scores on Regulation of Political Participation (variable 2.6) and the Competitiveness of Participation (variable 2.7) variables, a relatively detailed picture of the extent of political competition and opposition emerges.

CONFORMATION: THE CENTRALIZATION OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY (var. 2.8)

The centralized/federal distinction is an important structural property of national political systems that is related to several dimensions of authority patterns postulated by Eckstein and Gurr. In purely structural terms it is an aspect of Conformation: federal polities have greater complexity of Conformation than do centralized polities. Opportunities for Participation also tend to be higher in federal systems, and regional units of government potentially are more responsive to local inputs than are centralized governments.

2.8 CENT: Centralization of Political Authority

- (1) <u>Centralized:</u> Unitary state: no more than moderate decision-making authority is vested in local or regional governments. Many nominally "federal" systems, like the Soviet Union, are in fact centralized in this sense.
- (2) Intermediate Category
- (3) <u>Decentralized:</u> Federal state: local and/or regional governments have substantial decision-making authority. Switzerland, Canada, and the United States are contemporary examples of effectively-decentralized governments.

SCOPE (DIRECTIVENESS) OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS (var. 2.9)

Directiveness is defined as "the extent to which activities in a social unit are subject to directives, rather than being left to the free discretion of members" (Eckstein and Gurr, 1975:53). Directiveness varies from the Regimented extreme, in which "everything done in a social unit is dealt with, in every detail, by rigidly enforced directiveness" to Permissive, a situation in which there is "a tendency to issue Directives only insofar as the existence of the unit clearly requires it" (Eckstein and Gurr, 1975:54).

2.9 SOCPE: Scope of Government Actions

[Note: Tables 2.4.1 (also referred to as Table 2.5 in the original text) and 2.6 have been deleted.]

Scope is an operational version, applicable to the state, of Directiveness. It is a continuum which refers to the extent to which all levels of government combined -national, regional, and local -- attempt to regulate and organize the economic and social life of the citizens and subjects of the state. The Scope dimension does not refer to

the regulation or restriction of political activity, which is registered in the Political Participation variables 2.6 and 2.7.

In the realm of the state, we characterize the regimented extreme of scope as Totalitarian. Operationally, the Soviet Union during Stalin's rule and China during the Cultural Revolution define this end of the continuum. State and party during these periods attempted to direct or regulate virtually every aspect of social interaction, material production, distribution, and consumption. The Minimal state is one in which government functions are limited to such core functions as maintenance of the ruler's authority and dispute resolution. Even these activities may only be may only be carried out in the core regions of the national territory. The minimal state is typified by virtually all European states before the 1870s, by Ethiopia and Pakistan before the 1960s, and by Nepal before the 1970s.

The POLITY I coding of Scope used a five-category scale. POLITY II coding employs a nine-category scale: the five categories described verbally below plus four intermediate categories.

(1) <u>Totalitarian:</u> Governments that directly organize and control almost all aspects of social and economic life. Stalin's Russia and the contemporary Cuban states are examples.

(2) Intermediate Variable

(3) <u>Segmental Plus (+):</u> Governments whose activities are intermediate between segmental and totalitarian. These governments that provide almost all basic social services for their populations, and/or control large economic sectors, directly through state ownership or indirectly through detailed planning and regulation. Contemporary France and Sweden are examples, as are Mexico and Yugoslavia.

(4) Intermediate Variable

(5) <u>Segmental:</u> Public authorities provide a wide range of basic services plus close regulation of significant segments of social and/or economic activity, but leave large sectors free of direct state involvement. Examples: the contemporary U.S. and Canada.

(6) Intermediate Variable

(7) <u>Segmental Minus (-):</u> Public authorities provide limited basic services, e.g. public education, postal service, communication and transport facilities, and use state regulatory powers to ensure provision of some basic social services (e.g. for the unemployed and elderly). Most European democracies had this level of Scope by 1900, most Latin American countries by the 1940s.

(8) Intermediate Variable

(9) <u>Minimal:</u> Governments whose operations are largely or wholly limited to such core functions as maintenance of internal security and administration of justice. "Extractive", or "predatory" governments which exploit a population primarily for the benefit of the elite also are coded here; Haiti under the Duvaliers is an example.

All early 19th century states are coded 9. We screened their subsequent political histories for 1 legislation and policy initiatives that expanded the state's role in education, social services, and economic activity. Such policies marked coding shifts from 9 to 8, 7, and 6. By 1900 most European states were at 8 or 7, several at 6. In the POLITY I coding of Scope we also used data on central government expenditures per capita to help track the ion of state activities, particularly during the first half of the twentieth century. The thresholds associated with shifts in the coding categories are specified in Table 2.5. We judged the dollar "thresholds" of <u>each</u> category mainly by reference to per capita expenditures in countries whose Scope we had coded on the basis of other substantive information. These were not applied mechanistically, but rather were used to supplement more judgmental assessments made on

the basis of information about state regulation and management of economic activity, and about the nature and scope of public education and social services.

For the POLITY II coding we systematic use, beginning c. 1950, of data on central government spending as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GExp/GDP), calculated form annual data reported in Arthur A. 'Cross-Polity Time-Series Dataset (1986 version). This index could be constructed for most countries beginning c. 1946. In the edition of the dataset with which we worked the GDP data were missing after c. 1980. Based on a preliminary analysis of these ratios for all countries and various subgroupings, we specified ranges associated with various levels of Scope, as shown in the table 1. Separate ranges were identified for the poorest, "Fourth world" countries," based on our observation that minimal government functions in them require proportionally larger shares of their very limited productivity than in more prosperous countries.

The thresholds in Table 2.6 were used as general guidelines. Scores were adjusted to take into account particular regimes' programmatic objectives, policies in the economic realm, and other substantive information. A number of rules based on these considerations were formulated and applied, as shown in the notes to the table. The GMT/GDP ratios were particularly suspect as guides to the Scope of the state socialist regimes, which necessitated some <u>additional</u> guidelines.

In the POLITY I codings, Scope scores based on expenditure and policy criteria were assigned through 1970. The new GExp/GDP indicator was available for a substantial overlapping period, c. 1950-1970. Comparisons of POLITY I Scope scores with those suggested by table 2.4.2 for the overlapping period seldom showed differences of more than 1 category on the nine-category scale. It was possible to account for most discrepancies by taking into account contextual information on state policy, using the table 2.4.2 guidelines. In all countries we recoded back to the late 1940s, relying mainly on the GExp/GDP indicator.

Note 2.4: GENERAL GUIDELINES TO SCOPE TABLE

- a. "Poor countries" are those in the bottom quartile of per capita including most countries of South and Southeast Asia, most of tropical Africa, and a few Latin American countries such as Haiti and Y. Countries such as India and Nigeria moved out of the "poor" category during the period coded.
- b. When GExp/GDP ratios fluctuates substantially form Year to Year, a change in Scope ordinarily is not coded unless the ratio passes the threshold of the next category and remains more or less consistently above it thereafter. But if GEW/GDP ratios increase and decrease substantially in coincidence with the incumbency and ouster of a regime that follows activist socioeconomic policies, the Scope coding should reflect the year to-year changes.
- c. In federal systems, 1/3 is added to the GExp/GDP ratio. Empirical comparisons show that this ratio is typically 30-40% lower in federal systems than in otherwise-similar centralized systems.

Note 2.5: GUIDELINIES SPECIFIC TO PATTERNS OF POLICY

- a. In advanced state socialist polities:
 - * If there is total state control of the economy, code 1.
 - * If small-scale free-market activity is encouraged, or if agriculture is largely non-collectivized, code 2.
 - * If large-scale f et activity is encouraged, code 3.
- b. In predominantly agrarian societies:
 - * If there are major land reform program, subtract 1 or 2 from the Scope score derived from Table 2.4.2, depending on how extensively the program is implemented.
 - * If the state establishes control of the marketing of cash crops, subtract 2 from the Scope score derived from Table 2.4.2.
- c. In non-socialist societies:

- * If the state implements extensive nationalization, or directive national economic planning, subtract 1 or 2 form the Scope score derived from 7able 2.4.2, depending on the extent and impact of the intervention
- * If the state implements extensive denationalization, add I or 2 to the Scope score derived from table.
- * If the state invests in or establishes new try, no adjustment is indicated in the Scope score because the effects of the policy should be reflected in the GExp/GDP ratio.
- d. In states with corporate elements at the national level subtract 2 from the Scope score derived from Table 2.4.2. In quasi-corporate states, subtract 1 from the Scope score.
- e. In oil-rich countries, discount GExp/GDP ratios because state expenditures are mainly externally-funded. Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia are coded based on on Ahady's detailed study of the ion of state activities and expenditures in those countries (Ahady 1986).
- f. Discount the short-term impact of rapid militarization during large-scale conflict on GExp/C;DP ratios. Such ratios typically increase immediately before/during war, then decrease after Change the Scope coding only if they remain high thereafter.

3. <u>IDENTIFICATION OF MAJOR, ABRUPT POLITY</u>

This variable derives from Gurr's POLITY I dataset on regime persistence and change through 1970. The POLITY II dataset has extended the codings of "major, abrupt polity change" through 1986. The coding criteria for this variable are based on the direction and rate of change of the variables used in the POLITY I dataset. In an attempt to make the POLITY II dataset internally consistent, we have decided to translate the coding guidelines for this variable into the POLITY II language. For example, while a "major polity change" can be defined by a simple shift from "Designation" to "Competitive elections" in the "Selection of Executive" variable under the POLITY I guidelines, the POLITY II dataset defines this dataset as a multi-variable shift from "Transitional + Selection + Open" to "Regulated + Election + Open" in the "Regulation", "Competitiveness", and "Openness" of Executive Recruitment variables, respectively. In order to explain this complex procedure, both POLITY I and POLITY II guidelines will be provided.

Determining Polity changes

A polity comprises the basic political arrangements by which autonomous, national political communities ("countries") govern their affairs. Its basic elements are its structures of rule-making and rule-application and their relations with citizens or subjects. The life-span or durability of a polity is the length of time it endures without major, abrupt changes in the pattern of authority relations among these basic elements of authority relations.

(1) Abrupt Changes defined:

Any one major change (defined below) that is accomplished in ten years or less is an abrupt change.

(2) Major Changes defined:

These are operationally defined in terms of the authority variables, 2.1-2.9. The following changes in authority patterns are "major":

(2a) Executive Recruitment:

(2b) Monocratism:

For both the POLITY I and POLITY II datasets, an abrupt change to or from the "Collective Executive" category (#5 in the POLITY II dataset) is considered a major polity change.

(2c) Executive Constraints:

Any change of <u>two or more categories</u> is a polity change (1 to 3, 5 to 7, to "Substantial Limitations" or 4 to 6, etc.) except changes from 3 (Some Limits) to 5 (Substantial Limits) or 5 to 3.

(2d) Political Participation:

(2f) Scope of Government Activities (Variable 2.9)

Any abrupt change of 4 points or more on the scale, e.g., from Totalitarian (1) to Segmental (4) or from Minimal (9) to Segmental (4).

New laws or constitutions are not necessarily "major changes." Formal changes of the kinds listed above are regarded as "major changes" only if accompanied 'by substantial changes in practice. However, formal changes are usually a clue that changes in practice have and are now being legally ratified or a clue that changes in practice are to be at . If more detailed information is lacking, a formal, constitutional change of any of the specified types can be regarded as "major" provided the country has a history of attempting to govern by constitutional prescription.

Note that major changes in practice are "major" whether or not they are accompanied by formal, constitutional change.

"Revolutionary" seizures of power are not necessarily indicators of "major changes." Seizures of power often change only the office-holders, not the basic authority patterns of government. Similarly, the new "revolutionary" leaders may temporarily change the level of executive constraints or the extent of competition or regulation of participation -- say for a few months or a year and a half -- but then allow a return to "government as usual." Such temporary deviations from a basic authority pattern are not "polity changes." "Revolutionary" changes are like major constitutional changes: we need evidence that real changes are seriously attempted before we can decide that a new polity has been established.

Temporary "major changes" in authority are sometimes made by governments during crises. Political competition may be restricted during wartime. The executive may assume emergency powers during an economic crisis or natural disaster. These are not polity changes unless they are kept in force after the crisis has passed.

Several real, major changes often occur together. In Russia, for example, the period from 1917 to the mid-1920s saw a shift from ascriptive selection of the executive to designation, from a pure individual to a qualified individual executive, and from restricted to nonexistent political competition. These changes together constitute a single polity change, not seps6rate changes. Any series of linked changes, even if separated by several years, constitutes one not several polity changes.

3.1 CHANGE: Coding Polity Changes

Major, abrupt polity changes are coded to reflect the approximate dates of polity termination and establishment as well as whether or not the polity change in a new or established nation. Changes in polity authority characteristics are coded during the year in which they occur, even if they occur very late in the calendar year. Similarly, the circumstances of polity formation are attributed to the-year in which the polity is fully operative, not to the beginning of a transition period. And the circumstances of polity termination are attributed to the year in which the polity is terminated, whatever the month in which this happens. Exceptions to this rule exist when two or more major, abrupt polity changes occur in the same year. For example, in 1919 Hungary experienced the formation of two successive polities. The authority characteristics and circumstance of establishment and termination of the first 1919 polity are all coded for 1919. The authority characteristics and circumstances of the establishment of its successor are coded for 1920.

The following four categories are used:

(1) New Nation Now Polity

- (2) Old Nation, Polity Termination
- (3) Old Nation, New Polity Establishment
- (4) Old Nation, Old Polity Terminated and New Polity Established (in the same year)

It is important to note that the year of a polity termination will usually be identical to the date of establishment of the next polity, thus a coding of "4" will occur quite frequently. However, there may be an intervening period of civil war, or a period of foreign occupation, or transitional government which works out the ground-rules for the new polity, in which circumstance scores of "2" and "3" are used.

<u>Note</u> 3.1: If no polity establishment or termination occurs during a year, variable 3.1 is left blank. Similarly, variables 4.1 to 5.6 (below) are coded only for those, years in which a corresponding change of polity has occurred.

4. EVENTS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING/CAUSING POLITY TERMINATION

These four variables indicate the general circumstances of a polity's "death" or transformation, with special attention to the presence of crisis or violent conflict, if any. These variables are coded only if "major, abrupt polity change" is coded either 2 or 4. Each of the variables is mutually exclusive except that, rarely, a polity is terminated under circumstances of both external conflict (variable 4.2) and violent internal conflict (variable 4.3). Categories within each variable are mutually exclusive: only one can be coded for each polity.

4.1 TERM1: Loss of National Autonomy

Code for nations whose polities end when the nation itself gives up autonomous existence.

- (1) Nation voluntarily joins another, new or established state, or a confederation is dissolved voluntarily, ting in several new nations.
- (2) Nation is forcibly assimilated into or by another nation.
- (3) Nation joins another new or established state under violent from internal groups, e.g. Austria, 1938.

4.2 TERM2: External Conflict

Code for polities terminated in circumstances of international war, threat, or intervention. Code here only if the nation or its component parts maintain their autonomy; otherwise code under Old polity, loss of autonomy, above.

- (1) Polity change to deal with foreign war or threat.
- (2) Polity changes or directed by foreign power(s) (including foreign agencies like the CIA and international bodies like the UN), without direct military intervention.
- (3) Polity by foreign power(s) (West Germany in 1949, for example).
- (4) Other polity changes in the context of war.

Note that conditions (2) and (3) can in an existing nation without necessarily destroying its autonomy.

4.3 TERM3: Violent Internal Conflict

For polities terminated during or as a direct result of and internal wars.

(1) Polity change is the direct result of a successful cow or assassination or a small military uprising (barracks uprising)

- (2) Polity change is the direct t of an unsuccessful coup or assassination (for example, when an unsuccessful coup inspires the executive to eliminate political opposition permanently).
- (3) Polity change is by victorious rebels directly following an internal war.
- (4) Polity change is by incumbent rulers during or after an internal war or massive turmoil.
- (5) Other: Polity change is made of violent internal conflict under circumstances not classified under "1", "2", or "3" (for e, interregnum, government disintegration, or lack of precise information).

<u>Note 4.1:</u> Coups are seizures of power involving relatively few individuals and brief, relatively nonviolent conflict. Internal wars are longer-lived, large scale events such as revolutions, civil and guerrilla wars, and popular revolutions.

4.4 TERM4: Nonviolent Internal Political Transition

For polities terminated under internal circumstances other than those listed under variable 4.3.

- (1) Personalistic changes, without apparent internal crisis.
- (2) Personalistic changes, in the context of internal political crisis.
- (3) Institutional changes, without apparent internal crisis.
- (4) Institutional changes, in the context of internal political crisis.
- (5) Other nonviolent polity transitions, not classifiable above (for example because not clear whether personalistic or institutional).
- (6) Major change in political participation in the context of internal political crisis.

Note 4.2: Minor turmoil may occur during a "nonviolent" transition.

- a. <u>Personalistic changes:</u> Polity changes that mainly enhance the position of the executive and/or his immediate supporters. Establishment of dictatorial rule and suppression of peaceful opposition are usually "personalistic" changes unless accompanied by substantial change in such variables as scope of government activity or degree of centralism/federalism.
- b. <u>Institutional changes:</u> Changes in the basic structure, scope, and/or operations of government (for example, the creation of a one-party state, a shift from dictatorship to constitutional government, changes in the selection of the executive, etc.).
- c. <u>Internal crisis</u>: Internal conditions or conflict which (explicitly or implicitly) place stress on governmental operations. Examples (not an exhaustive list) are natural disasters; economic depressions; intense class, ethnic, or religious conflicts; demands for massive socioeconomic change; factional conflict within the elite; demands for representation; etc.

5. EVENTS SIGNIFYING POLITY FORMATION

The following variables indicate the circumstances of a new polity's "birth, with special attention to the presence of crisis or violent conflict, if any. Five sets of coding categories are listed below: two for new nations (variables 5.1 and 5.2) and three for established nations (variables 5.3-5.5). For established nations, the circumstances of a "polity termination" (variables 4.3 and 4.4) are usually but not necessarily the same as those of

origin for the next polity. The exceptions are most likely for polities which originate with a "transitional period." For hypothetical example, the old polity may terminate with a coup d'etat, followed by a several-year transitional period that is concluded by nonviolent institutional changes. The institutional changes that characterize the transitional period are coded here.

5.1 ORIG1: Origin of New Nation's Polity

- (1) Polity imposed under the tutelage of the former power, while still in authority.
- (2) Polity directed by the former or another country, after, or as part of, the attainment off independence.
- (3) Polity developed by citizens or the head of state of the new country, whether or not borrowed from some other source.

5.2 ORIG2: Circumstances of New Nation's Birth

Nations Established in Circumstances of International or Internal War:

- (1) Colony becomes independent (including territories captured and returned to autonomy after war).
- (2) Region secedes from a larger nation.
- (3) Successor state or states to the or partition of a nation, state, empire, federation, etc.
- (4) Coalition or union of formerly-separate states or territories.

Nations Established in Circumstances Free of Violent Conflict:

- (5) Colony becomes independent.
- (6) Region secedes from a larger nation.
- (7) Successor state to the breakup or partition of a nation, etc.
- (8) Coalition or union of formerly-separate states or territories.
- (9) Other new nations: for example, establishment of new states in previously uncolonized areas (like the Orange Free State).

5.3 ORIG3: Established Nations, External Conflict

For polities established in existing nations, and after an interregnum, in circumstances of external war, foreign threat, or direct intervention.

- (1) Polity change to deal with foreign war or threat.
- (2) Polity change or change imposed by, foreign power(s) (including international agencies and agencies like the CIA) without direct military intervention.
- (3) Polity change by imposed by occupying foreign power(s) (West Germany in 1949, for example).
- (4) Other polity changes in the context of war.

Note 5.1: The conditions in categories (2) and (3) can occur in an existing nation without necessarily destroying its autonomy.

5.4 ORIG4: Established Nations, Violent Internal Conflict

For polities established in existing nations during or as a direct result of coups, internal wars, or <u>massive</u> turmoil (riots, demonstrations)

- (1) Polity change is the direct result of a successful coup or assassination or a small military uprising (barracks uprising).
- (2) Polity change is the direct result of an unsuccessful coup or assassination (for example, when an unsuccessful coup inspires the executive to eliminate political opposition permanently).
- (3) Political change is made b by victorious rebels directly following an internal war.
- (4) Polity change is made by incumbent rulers during or after an internal war or massive turmoil.
- (5) Other: Polity change is made because of violent internal conflict under circumstances not classifiable under 1,2 or 3 (for example interregnum, government disintegration, or lack of precise information).

Note 5.2: See note 4.1.

5.5 ORIG5: Nonviolent Internal Political Transitions

For polities established in existing nations under circumstances other than those listed above.

- (1) Personalistic changes, without apparent internal crisis.
- (2) Personalistic changes, in the context of internal political crisis.
- (3) Institutional changes, without apparent international crisis.
- (4) Institutional changes, in the context of internal political crisis.
- (5) Other nonviolent polity participation, not classifiable above (for example, because not clear whether personalistic or institutional.)
- (6) Major change in political participation in the context of internal political crisis.

Note 5.3: See note 4.2 for definitions of personalistic and institutional changes.

5.6 MODEL: Source of Model

The source or inspiration of the new polity's pattern of authority relations is coded here.

(1) New, Imposed: The polity is one that is new to the country and is imposed or prescribed by external agents. Examples are the imposition of a new form of autonomous government by an invading foreign power, such as the Vichy Regime created in France after the German invasion in 1940-41; institutions established by a Recolonizing power, such as the polities of almost all independent African countries; and institutions created under the tutelage of foreign commissions, e.g., in Albania in 1913 and in West Germany, 1949.

- (2) <u>New, Borrowed:</u> The polity model is modeled after some foreign system but is chosen and implemented without external coercion or persuasion. Most Latin American states chose new polities at the time of their independence that were modeled after the United States, for example.
- (3) New, Indigenous: The new polity is mainly an indigenous creation, not visibly the result of imitation. The Nazi polity established in 1933 is an example. The French Fifth Republic is another; it is a "presidential" system, but not one designed in imitation of the U.S. or some other model. (It also is not a "reversion," described below, because previous "strong executive" polities in French history were headed by non-elected monarchs).
- (4) <u>Reversion:</u> A return to a pattern of political arrangements in effect in the country within the past generation. The Colombian polity established in 1958 following a five-year dictatorship was clearly a reversion, with temporary modifications, to the president-dominant polity of the pre-1953 era.
- (5) Continuation: Continuation of previous polity structure.

6. INDICATORS OF DEMOCRACY, AUTOCRACY, AND CENTRALIZATION OF POWER

Three broad processes have reshaped the global landscape of state structures during the last two centuries. One is an extraordinary ion in the absolute and relative power of the sate, a process that began in Europe. The new states created by the American and French revolutions marked the threshold between a political world dominated by monarchies, whose claims to absolutism were belied by the fact that most social and economic life was autonomous from state control or extraction, and a political world in which state @r was based on ever-widening control and mobilization of human and material resources in exchange for broadened rights of popular participation. An integral part of this process was the development of bureaucracies with high capacities to regulate, tax, and mobilize people in the service of state policy.

The second process was the transformation of the structures of political participation and legitimation. This transformation followed one of two paths, t plural democracy or mass-party autocracy. The popular side of the bargain by which most West European rulers built state power in the nineteenth century was to knowledge the right of widespread participation in policy making. That right was given institutional expression in elected assemblies which could review, and sometimes initiate, public policy; in elections, direct or indirect, of chief ministers; and in recognition of citizens' rights to voice and act on political opinions. The concept of bargain is a metaphor for sequences of political crises and reforms in which these rulers granted rights for participation, however limited, to all significant social classes and groups, while simultaneously extending the state's right and capacity to regulate, tax, and mobilize the human and material bases of state power.

The process of political democratization had its own logic and c which, in most of Western Europe, eroded all but a few symbolic vestiges of traditional autocracy (see for example Bendix 1978). Nonetheless, pressures to extend democratization have always contended with the self-interested desire of rulers to preserve and enhance their autonomy from political constraints. The empires of Central and Eastern Europe -- Germany, Russia, Austro-Hungary -- implemented the trappings but not the substance of effective democratic participation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. And all of them collapsed under the combined pressure of unsuccessful was and internal dissension. The revolutionary Soviet state in Russia provided a new model of autocracy which combined democratic forms -- a mass party and nominally representative institutions -- with near-absolute state control of social, economic and political life. In the middle run the new model has proven, in Europe and China, to be almost as resilient as the Western democratic forms, although less efficient for some social and economic purposes.

The third general process has been the "Westernization" of state structures elsewhere in the world. The European-derived models have been widely imitated, beginning with the establishment of derivative democracies in the newly independent states of nineteenth century Latin America and concluding with the socialist autocracies of most of the post-revolutionary states of contemporary Afro-Asia.

In an attempt to facilitate empirical analysis of these and other historical trends, we have constructed annual scores for democracy, autocracy, and centralization of state power. Derived from Gurr's authority characteristics data (variables 2.12.9), composite indicators of these general properties of political systems were constructed.

6.1 AUTOC: Institutionalized Autocracy

"Authoritarian regime" in Western political discourse is a pejorative term for some very diverse kinds of political systems whose common properties are a lack of regularized political competition and disconcern for political freedoms. We use the more neutral term Autocracy and define it operationally in terms of the presence of a distinctive set of political characteristics. In mature form, autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation. Their chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite, and one in office they exercise power with few institutional constraints. Most modern autocracies also exercise a high degree of directiveness over social and economic activity, but we regard this as a function political ideology and choice, not a defining property of autocracy. Social democracies also exercise relatively high degrees of directiveness. We prefer to leave open for empirical investigation the question of how Autocracy, Democracy, and Directiveness have covaried over time.

A ten-point Autocracy scale is constructed additively. Our operative indicator of autocracy is derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation (variable 2.7), the regulation of participation (variable 2.6), the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment (variables 2.3 and 2-4), and constraints on the chief executive (variable 2.5).

Authority Coding	Scale Weight
Competitiveness of Participation:	
Suppressed	+2
Restricted	+1
Regulation of Participation:	
Restricted	+2
Factional/Restricted	+1
Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment:	
Selection	+2
Openness of Executive Recruitment (only if	competitiveness is coded Selection):
Closed	+1
Dual:designation	+1
Constraints an Chief Executive:	
Unlimited authority	+3
2 (intermediate category)	+2
Slight to moderate limitations	+1

The logic of this "Institutionalized autocracy" scale is similar to that of the Institutionalized democracy scale, below, and it is subject to the same kinds of operational redefinition to suit different theoretical purposes. Note that the two scales do not share any categories in common. Nonetheless many polities have mixed authority traits, and thus can have middling scores on both Autocracy and Democracy scales. These are the kinds of polities which were characterized as "anocratic" and "incoherent" in the POLITY I studies. As a group they proved to less durable than coherent democracies and autocracies (see Gurr 1974, 1 1980, Lichbach 1984).

6.2 DEMOC: Institutionalized Democracy

Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. Other aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems of checks and balances, freedom of the press, and so on are means to, or specific manifestations of, these general principles. We do not have coded data on civil liberties. Instead our operational indicator of democracy is derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation (variable 2.7), the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment (variables 2.6 and 2.5), and constraints on the chief executive (variable 2.4).

The Democracy indicator is an additive ten-point scale, constructed using these weights.

Authority Coding	Scale Weight	
Competitiveness of Political Participation:		
Competitive	+3	
Transitional	+2	
Factional	+1	
Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment:		
Election	+2	
Transitional	+1	
Openness of Executive Recruitment (only if Competitiveness is Election or Transitional):		
Dual: election	+1	
Election	+1	
Constraints on Chief Executive:		
Executive parity or subordination	+4	
6 (intermediate category)	+3	
Substantial limitations	+2	
5 (intermediate category)	+1	

This "Institutional democracy" indicator follows a logic similar to that underlying the POLITY I analyses. There is no "necessary condition" for characterizing a political system as democratic, rather democracy is treated as a variable. For example, the scale discriminates among Western parliamentary and presidential systems based on the extent of constraints on the chief executive. Charles de Gaulle as president of the French Fifth Republic operated within slight to moderate political limitations. Thus the early years of the Fifth Republic have lower Democracy scores than the United States or the Federal Republic of Germany, where constraints on the executive approach parity. Similarly, the onset of "cohabitation" in France during the second phase of the first Mitterand presidency is marked by a shift to parity on the Executive Constraints scale and a concomitant increase in France's Democracy score.

If the composite indicator of institutionalized democracy is inappropriate for some conceptual purposes, it can be easily redefined either by altering the constituent categories and weights, or by specifying some minimum preconditions. A mature and internally coherent democracy, for example, might be operationally defined as one in which (a) political participation is fully competitive, (b) executive recruitment is elective, and (c) constraints on the chief executive are substantial.

6.3 CONCEN: Concentration of Power

As suggested above, we regard the concentration of power in the hands of state authorities to be analytically and functionally distinct form democracy and autocracy. The typical nineteenth century autocracy exercised less effective control over its subjects than the typical activist welfare democracy of the late twentieth century. "Power" has many meanings, two of which can be indexed more or less directly using the POLITY II dataset.

Scope (variable 2.9), as coded, is a measure of the extent to which the state uses its powers of regulation and command to direct social and economic activity. An alternative measure of power concentration is based on the institutional characteristics of the polity. Institutional power is least in polities where political competition is divisive and unregulated, where political authority is dispersed among different individuals and institutions, and where peripheral regions have some autonomy form central authority. The opposite traits--institutional control of competition and executive recruitment, concentration of national power in a unitary state headed by a strong executive -- signify a high degree of institutional power. Our composite ten-point indicator of power concentration is built on the regulation of participation (variable 2.6), regulation of executive recruitment (variable 2.1) competitiveness of executive recruitment (variable 2.2), constraints on the chief executive (variable 2.5), monocratism (variable 2.4), and centralization of authority (variable 2.8).

Authority Coding	Scale Weight	
Regulation of Participation:		
Regulated	+2	
Restricted	+1	
Regulation of Executive Recruitment:		
Regulated	+1	
Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment:		
Selection	+1	
Election	+1	
Constraints on the Chief Executive:		
None	+3	
2 (intermediate category)	+2	
Slight to moderate limits	+1	
Monocratism:		
Pure individual executive	+1	
Centralization:		
Unitary state	+2	

It will be observed that this indicator includes some categories that are the defining properties of both democratic and autocratic polities, as well as several other authority traits. While the highest concentrations of institutional power are to be found in highly autocratic polities, high power concentrations are not uncommon among modern democracies.

6.4 COHER: Coherence of Political Institutions

Eckstein (1969: 300-307) proposed that polities with coherent (internally consistent) authority patterns should outperform and outlast those with incoherent patterns. Research using the POLITY I data set indicator of Coherence generally supported the t (Gurr 1974, 1 1980, Lichbach 1984). "Coherent" polities in POLITY II are



¹ This is precisely comparable to the procedure used to index Coherence in the POLITY I studies. See Gurr 1974:1497.

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