Cooperation in World Politics:
The Constraining and Constitutive Effects of International Organizations

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Abstract: Many scholars accept the important role international organizations (IOs) play in facilitating cooperation among states in world politics, yet there is disagreement about the theoretical mechanisms that best account for the positive correlation between shared IO memberships and cooperation. Institutionalist and Rationalists treat state preferences as fixed and emphasize the influence of IO memberships on interstate bargaining. In this view, IOs act as constraints, because while they help states negotiate more efficiently (with fewer costs & greater information), they do not significantly alter states’ preferences. Constructivists, on the other hand, recognize that organizations can alter member states’ identities and interests, and that long and deep commitments to international organizations can have constitutive effects on member states’ preferences and behavior. In this paper, I derive several hypotheses about the constraining and constitutive effects of IOs on member state behavior from existing theoretical arguments in the IR literature and evaluate these claims empirically using data on contentious issues from the Issue Correlates of War Project. Empirical analyses show that while shared IO memberships (frequency and duration) neither prevent the onset of new contentious issues nor promote more frequent peaceful settlement attempts, they do decrease the use of militarized force and produce more successful negotiation attempts. Disputants are much more likely to reach and comply with agreements to end contentious issue claims when they share more frequent and durable memberships in international organizations.

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The growth in the number and influence of global and regional international organizations over the past century has been staggering. Since 1909, the number of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) increased from 37 to over 6400 and the number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) grew from 176 to over 44,000 (http://www.uia.org/uiastats/ytb199.htm). Social scientists and policy makers disagree about how much influence these regional and global organizations wield over countries’ behavior and interstate interactions. This disagreement is apparent when we consider the variation in theoretical arguments relating institutions to cooperation, ranging from positive to negative to nonexistent.¹

Institutionalist scholars (e.g. Keohane, 1984) argue that institutions promote cooperation between member states by increasing information, decreasing uncertainty, enhancing legal liability, and raising the reputational stakes for reneging on agreements.² They also stress the active role that international organizations play in the conflict management process, serving as mediators or adjudicators to help member countries resolve international conflicts (e.g. Abbott and Snidal, 1998; Russett and Oneal, 2001). International organizations may facilitate cooperation among member states passively (Mitchell and Hensel, 2006), something long recognized in the international law literature. For example, if two countries recognize the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), then the ability for both sides to take disputes to the ICJ may enhance the chances that they will reach agreements out of court (Bilder, 1998). A similar process has been observed in the World Trade Organization and the European Court of Justice: the strong legal dispute mechanisms in these institutions deter countries from making frivolous claims (Allee, 2003; Burley and Mattli, 1993). International organizations may also promote cooperation among members indirectly, by promoting democratization among members (Pevehouse, 2002), which in turn strengthens interstate peace because democracies do not fight wars against other democracies (Russett and Oneal, 2001).

¹ Cooperation is defined generally as policy coordination, or when two or more countries’ policies become more compatible with each other and facilitate each other’s goals (Keohane, 1984: 51-53). Cooperation also refers to peaceful interactions (or the absence of militarized conflict) and compliance with the terms of international agreements. Institutions have been conceptualized both as formal agreements (e.g. IGOs) and more broadly as regimes, which are “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations (Krasner, 1982: 186)” In this paper, I adopt the more formalistic view of international institutions.

² Further, membership in an IO means that states pay sovereignty costs, contracting costs, and agency costs. These costs make credible commitment possible, which implies that only states that really mean to abide by IO rules should sign on in the first place.
The counterpoint to these optimistic views of institutions as facilitators of interstate cooperation is articulated most clearly by realists (e.g. Mearsheimer, 1994-95), who view international organizations as epiphenomenal. In other words, realists contend that institutions merely reflect power relationships in world politics, and as such, membership in IOs has no effect on states’ foreign policy behavior. Countries may comply with the terms of international treaties simply because they require very little change in behavior (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, 1996). International organizations may sometimes promote conflict among member states or increase the chances for conflict between member states and non-member states. These conflict promoting patterns of IOs have been described by scholars studying military alliances\(^3\), preferential trade agreements (which may promote economic conflict across trading blocs), and military interventions in domestic politics (e.g. NATO intervention in Kosovo).

The pessimistic view of institutions posed by realists has structured theoretical debates around the question of whether institutions matter, rather than when or how they matter. “Since the 1980s, work on international institutions has been defined for the most part by the demand that scholars respond to a realist agenda: to prove that institutions have a significant effect on state behavior…either institutions matter or they do not. Insufficient attention has been given to the mechanisms through which we might expect institutional effects to work” (Martin and Simmons, 1998: 742-743). A variety of scholars have begun to explore these mechanisms more carefully, focusing on the design of international institutions.

Even among scholars who accept the important role international organizations play in promoting interstate cooperation, there is disagreement about the theoretical mechanisms or processes that best account for the positive correlation between shared IO memberships and peaceful/cooperative relationships (e.g. Russett and Oneal, 2001). Institutionalist and rationalist approaches treats state preferences as fixed and emphasize the influence of IO memberships on interstate bargaining. In this view, IOs act as constraints, because while they help states negotiate more efficiently (with fewer costs & greater information), they do not significantly alter states’ international preferences. Constructivists, on the other hand, recognize that organizations can alter members’ identities and interests, and that long and deep commitments to international organizations may have constitutive effects on member states’ preferences and

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\(^3\) The literature on military alliances identifies conditions when allies may fight each other (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981) and also discusses offensive alliances, which promote conflict against non-alliance members, often specify the conditions under which members will attack other countries (Leeds, 2003)
behavior. While both theoretical positions have been evaluated empirically in each theoretical camp, comparative tests of both arguments are rare (although see Schimmelfennig, 2003).

In this paper, I derive several hypotheses about the constraining and constitutive effects of IOs on member state behavior from existing theoretical arguments in the IR literature and evaluate these claims empirically using data on contentious issues from the Issue Correlates of War Project (Hensel, 2001; Hensel, Mitchell, and Sowers, 2004). Empirical analyses show that while shared IO memberships (frequency and duration) neither prevent the onset of new contentious issues nor promote more frequent peaceful settlement attempts, they do decrease the use of militarized force and produce more successful negotiation attempts. Disputants are much more likely to reach and comply with agreements to end contentious issue claims when they share more frequent and durable memberships in international organizations. The analyses provide evidence for both constraining and constitutive effects of IOs on member states’ behavior, although the results are strongest for the institutionalist/rationalist hypotheses.

The Constraining Effects of International Organizations

Institutionalist (e.g., Keohane, 1984; Keohane and Martin, 1995) and rationalist (e.g., Koremenos et al, 2001; Boehmer et al, 2004) theories of international organizations treat state preferences as fixed and exogenous. Because states are rational egoists, they have incentives to defect from cooperative agreements and/or free-ride in the provision of international public goods. Institutions (or regimes more broadly) help to mitigate these tendencies for free riding and defection in a variety of ways. First, international institutions establish patterns of legal liability or accountability. Institutions serve as quasi-agreements and “like contracts, help to organize relationships in mutually beneficial ways…Contracts, conventions, and quasi-agreements provide information and generate patterns of transaction costs: costs of reneging on commitments are increased, and the costs of operating within these frameworks are reduced.” (Keohane, 1984: 89) Similarly, “other forces—such as transparency, reciprocity, accountability, and regime-mindedness—allow regimes to impose significant constraints on international behavior under the right conditions.” (Mitchell, 1994:429)

The second way in which institutions facilitate cooperation involves reducing transaction costs and thereby making it easier for states to negotiate agreements. The centralization and independence of IOs enhance their efficiency and reduce the costs of bargaining for member
states (Abbott and Snidal, 1998). Institutions transform single shot games to iterated games and lengthen the shadow of the future, reducing transaction costs of legitimate contracts and raising the costs of illegitimate ones. Institutions also provide regular forums for meetings and negotiations, and link various clusters of issues together, facilitating the arrangement of side-payments (Keohane, 1984:90-91).

Third, international institutions increase the flow of information among member states. “Regimes may also include international organizations whose secretariats act not only as mediators but as providers of unbiased information that is made available, more or less equally to all members. By reducing asymmetries of information through a process of upgrading the general level of available information, international regimes reduce uncertainty.” (Keohane, 1984: 94) Private information creates incentives for states to misrepresent their true interests in the bargaining process (Fearon, 1995), something institutions can help to mitigate through their provision of objective information about each side’s capabilities, resolve, and interests (Abbott and Snidal, 1998).

Another way that institutions can improve the prospects for cooperation involves states’ concern with their reputation. The general argument is that when states are acting in the context of international institutions (or regimes), they are more likely to comply with cooperative agreements out of consideration for their reputation in future bargaining situations. Keohane (1984: 94), for example, contends that: “A government’s reputation therefore becomes an important asset in persuading others to enter into agreements with it. International regimes help governments to assess others’ reputations by providing standards of behavior against which performance can be measured, by linking these standards to specific issues, and by providing forums, often through international organizations, in which these evaluations can be made.” Duffield (1992) makes a similar argument in his study of the size of conventional forces in NATO. Not only does compliance reinforce the tendency for other states to comply with the same agreement, it also “may increase the willingness of states to enter into further, mutually beneficial arrangements.” (Duffield, 1992: 836)

Reputation costs for noncompliance may be particularly acute when important regional or global institutions, such as the European Union, Organization of American States, or the United Nations, become directly involved in a dispute resolution process. Such institutions deal with a wide variety of issues, giving them leverage to provide greater linkages across issues (Keohane,
1984; Martin and Simmons, 1998). Abbott and Snidal (1998: 26) make a similar point about IOs: “They increase the prospect of continued interaction, often across issues, and generalize reputational effects of reneging across members of the organization.” If these institutions are viewed with legitimacy by member states, the chances for compliance increase (Milner, 1993). Furthermore, non-compliance with an IO-based judgment, especially a binding judgment (through arbitration or adjudication), may call into question a state’s respect for the international legal order and the rule of law.

Beyond reputation concerns, international institutions also offer other important advantages that can increase the likelihood of states striking and complying with international agreements. First, IOs can offer greater legitimacy in reaching an agreement than states serving as third party mediators, whose involvement and decisions are likely to be seen as more political and less legalistic in nature (Pevehouse, 2002). Second, IOs may be convenient scapegoats and allow leaders to save face (Rovine, 1976), especially when the settlement is politically unpopular at home (Abbott and Snidal, 1998: 22-23) or the disputing countries have otherwise cordial relations (Fischer, 1982). Third, guarantees by institutional third parties can be helpful for mitigating the security dilemma that arises in contentious dyads, increasing the likelihood that agreements will be carried out. For example, Walter (1997) develops a credible commitment theory of civil war resolution, arguing that negotiations succeed only when third parties are willing to verify and enforce demobilization. Finally, outside parties may pledge to uphold an IO-based decision by force, they may tie aid decisions to compliance, or they might withhold IO benefits, all of which raise the costs of non-compliance (Abbott and Snidal, 1998).

Institutions can also help to resolve conflicts directly as third parties. This includes both facilitative intervention in the form of good offices, mediation, conciliation, and fact-finding, and binding intervention in the form of arbitration or adjudication (Abbott and Snidal, 1998). When such techniques are employed, the institution plays a much more active role in conflict settlement than simply increasing the flow of information or reducing transaction costs. Instead,
the institution itself can be called upon to help resolve the contentious issue(s) in question, perhaps even through a binding settlement that both disputants agree in advance to accept.

As Keohane (1984: 88) notes, agreements concluded in the context of an international regime might be superior to those concluded in other (e.g. bilateral) contexts. “International regimes perform the functions of establishing patterns of legal liability, providing relatively symmetrical information, and arranging the costs of bargaining so that specific agreements can more easily be made...Governments believe that ad hoc attempts to construct particular agreements, without a regime framework, will yield inferior results compared to negotiations within the framework of regimes.” This suggests that settlements brokered by international institutions may be more effective, in the sense that the disputing parties are more likely to accept the terms of settlement. These effects of institutions are strongest for attempts to settle contentious issues through the binding techniques of arbitration and adjudication. Compliance is more likely with binding institutional agreements because the reputation costs for reneging are higher, the perceived legitimacy of the institutional decision is greater, and decisions reached through institutional arbitration or adjudication are more likely to be supported by IO members (Mitchell and Hensel, 2006).

Institutions thus promote interstate cooperation by enhancing legal liability, reducing transaction costs, increasing information, iterating interactions, raising the reputation costs for reneging on agreements, and mitigating credible commitment problems. And yet, how well institutions promote cooperation may depend on institutional design. Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal (2001) argue that the variance in institutional design can be captured along several dimensions including membership (exclusive vs. inclusive), scope (what issues are covered), centralization (degree to which a single entity performs institutional tasks), control (voting arrangements), and flexibility (how institutional rules and procedures adapt to new circumstances). Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom (2004) also emphasize institutional design, arguing that IOs best promote cooperation between members when they have clear mandates for security, strong internal member cohesion, and strong institutional mechanisms for sanctioning and enforcement. Scholars have also emphasized the extent to which the design of various institutions adequately resolves both informational and distributional concerns (Krasner, 1991; Morrow, 1994; Martin and Simmons, 1998).
Institutionalist and rationalist scholars view international organizations as constraints, in the sense that their primary effect is to alter the efficiency of bargaining processes. What states want is exogenous to the institution, and yet what states can achieve cooperatively is much broader because of membership in the institution. In essence, the range of mutually acceptable outcomes is enlarged when bargaining states share IO memberships because they have better information about their opponents’ capabilities and resolve and they are more confident that bargains that are reached will be carried out by all parties. If this view is accurate, IOs should exhibit their strongest effects in the bargaining stage. Shared IO memberships should make agreements easier to reach and raise the likelihood of compliance. Militarized conflict should also be less likely in such settings because the range of mutually acceptable peaceful bargains is larger. On the other hand, shared IO memberships should not influence states’ decisions to initiate new interstate conflicts because states’ preferences are exogenous to IOs. Furthermore, the length of shared IO commitments should not be especially relevant for interstate cooperation unless the design and institutionalization of IOs change significantly over time.

H1A (Constraining): As dyadic shared IO memberships increase, pairs of states will be more likely to attempt peaceful settlements to resolve contentious issues.6

H1B (Constraining): As dyadic shared IO memberships increase, pairs of states will be more likely to reach and comply with peaceful agreements to resolve contentious issues.

H1C (Constraining): As dyadic shared IO memberships increase, pairs of states will be less likely to employ militarized force to resolve contentious issues.

The Constitutive Effects of International Organizations

Constructivist theories of international organizations emphasize the constitutive effects of IOs, challenging a number of Institutionalist and Rationalist assumptions. First, IOs are not viewed as organizations that simply aggregate or reflect (median) member states’ preferences. IOs are depicted as organizations with complex bureaucracies, where bureaucrats can have agendas independent from member states and where multiple agendas and agencies are possible (Ness and Brechin, 1988; Finnemore, 1993; Barnett and Finnemore, 1999).7 Second, because

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6 Issue claims, peaceful settlement attempts, agreements, and compliance are defined fully in the research design section.
7 I focus on the socialization of states as unitary actors, although some studies look at socialization of individuals/representatives working for IOs. See for example Peck’s (1979) review article and Hooghe’s (2005) analysis of the European Commission.
entrepreneurs (individuals or groups) can capture the attention of IO bureaucrats, new ideas and policies can emerge in international organizations and member states (and their citizens) may be socialized to accept them. Third, the extent to which IO norms become internalized may depend on the distribution of power among groups inside the state and their agenda setting capabilities (Cortell and Davis, 1996; Haas, 1989; Checkel, 1999). In this regard, state preferences are influenced both by internal and external political processes. Institutionalists assume that shared interests create the conditions for institutional formation, whereas constructivists focus on how IOs produce new norms once established (Finnemore, 1993: 594). Schimmelfennig (2003: 70) emphasizes this relationship between IOs and state identities and interests:

Whereas rationalist institutionalism emphasizes the instrumental, efficiency-enhancing functions of international organizations in the service of state actors, sociological institutionalism sees them as autonomous and potentially powerful actors with constitutive and legitimacy-providing effects. International organizations are “community representatives” as well as community-building agencies...they do not simply regulate state behavior but shape state identities and interests.

Barnett & Finnemore (1993) argue that IOs shape members’ interests and identities because they “embody a form of authority, rational-legal authority, that modernity views as particularly legitimate and good” (p. 707). IOs present themselves as neutral, objective actors that serve others’ interests, encouraging states to accept their authority and actions with legitimacy. This authority status allows IOs to engage in a number of activities that influence member states including classification of actors and actions, the fixing of meanings, and the diffusion of new norms (Barnett and Finnemore, 1993: 710). In other words, IOs are able to engage in a process of collective legitimization (Claude, 1966). However, this authority status also comes with a price for member states, as IOs often engage in pathological or dysfunctional behavior that goes against members’ interests.

The socialization effects of IOs may extend to both member and non-member states. Internally, IOs socialize member states by promoting democratization of member states (Pevehouse, 2002), promoting economic liberalization, and encouraging members to adopt peaceful conflict management strategies (Mitchell 2002). More broadly, “international

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8 Finnemore (1993) analyzes the actions by UNESCO and leading scientists, concluding that they played an essential role in socializing states “to accept the promotion and direction of science as a necessary and appropriate role...science policy was an appropriate and necessary task of states, regardless of objective science, developmental, or security conditions (p. 593).”
organizations may...encourage states to expand their conception of the interests at stake, promoting more inclusive and longer-term thinking; shape general norms and principles of appropriate behavior; or encourage empathy and mutual identification among peoples” (Russett and Oneal, 2001: 37). Thus IOs should produce a convergence in state behavior and interests over time, with the internal socialization effects having their strongest effects on the institutions’ oldest members (Hooghe, 2005). Schimmelfennig (2003) describes this socialization process as an inclusive strategy of community building, where aspiring members join an IO and become socialized to the community’s rules and norms. We can contrast this with an external socialization process or what Schimmelfennig (2003: 74) labels an exclusive strategy of community building: “The community organizations communicate their constitutive values and norms to outsider states and tell them to what extent they have to internalize them before being entitled to join.”

One example of the internal socialization process involves the encouragement of peaceful conflict management strategies by international organizations. The charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) emphasizes the peaceful settlement of disputes in several articles. Article 3 states that controversies are to be settled peacefully, while Article 24 suggests multiple techniques for conflict resolution including direct negotiation, good offices, mediation, investigation and conciliation, judicial settlement, and arbitration. Similar articles can be found in numerous charters or treaties associated with both regional and global institutions, ranging from the League of Nations and United Nations to the Arab League, African Union, and ASEAN. International courts, such as the International Court of Justice, also encourage pacific dispute settlement out of court for members recognizing the court’s jurisdiction (Bilder, 1998). IOs that emphasize peaceful conflict resolution techniques in their charter will socialize member states to be more open to peaceful settlement techniques and to view settlements reached through peaceful means with greater legitimacy (Mitchell, 2002). It is also possible that such benefits will extend beyond IOs, creating systemic expectations about peaceful conflict management practices.

Much like the rationalist IO literature, constructivists have also identified a series of institutional design features that influence the process of IO socialization. Johnston (2001) identifies two key micro-processes of socialization: persuasion and social influence. States are more likely to be persuaded by IOs that are novel, authoritative, characterized by agents
autonomous from their principals (much like Finnemore’s (1993) UNESCO technocrats promoting a science bureaucracy), and populated by states that receive “counter-attitudinal information repeatedly over time” (p. 499). Similarly, IOs are better able to wield social influence over their member states if states join IOs in the absence of threats or sanctions, if arguments in favor of joining “stress backpatting and image benefits, diffuse reputation benefits, and opprobrium costs” (Johnston, 2001: 506), and if remaining out of the IO is “highly isolating” for potential member states. Hooghe’s (2005) theory of socialization processes in the European Commission also points to the importance of novelty (initial experiences have stronger socializing effects than later experiences), and primacy (new members are socialized more quickly than old ones).

My empirical tests below focus on the socialization effects of IOs on member states only, leaving aside the external effects of IOs for future research. To capture the extent to which IOs constitute their members’ identities and interests, I look at the length of joint IO membership time (years), anticipating that pairs of states with a longer history of shared membership will be more strongly socialized to the IO’s culture and norms. As described more fully in the research design section, I limit my empirical analysis to IOs that explicitly promote peaceful conflict management practices in their charters. This avoids the pitfalls that inevitably arise from lumping together all IOs into a single category (Boehmer et al 2004), although I certainly recognize the importance of institutional design on IO socialization processes, and hope to evaluate design issues more carefully in the future. I evaluate the following four hypotheses about the constitutive effects of IOs on member states.

H2A (Constitutive): As dyadic shared time in IOs increases, pairs of states will be less likely to initiate new issue claims.

H2B (Constitutive): As dyadic shared time in IOs increases, pairs of states will be more likely to attempt peaceful settlements to resolve contentious issues.

H2C (Constitutive): As dyadic shared time in IOs increases, pairs of states will be more likely to reach and comply with peaceful agreements to resolve contentious issues.

H2D (Constitutive): As dyadic shared time in IOs increases, pairs of states will be less likely to employ militarized force to resolve contentious issues.
**Research Design**

To empirically evaluate the constraining and constitutive effects of IOs on interstate cooperation, I focus on the onset and management of interstate claims over three issues: territory, maritime zones, and cross-border rivers. Data on contentious issues are taken from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project.\(^9\) The ICOW project is engaged in collecting data on contentious territorial, maritime, and river issues, with information on the salience of each issue and on attempts to settle each claim peacefully or through militarized force. Territorial claims involve questions of sovereignty over a specific piece of land (including islands), maritime claims occur when states disagree about the ownership or usage of a maritime area, while river claims arise over the usage and/or navigation of a river that crosses state boundaries. Territorial claims are coded by the ICOW project from 1816-2001, while maritime and river claims are coded from 1900-2001.\(^10\)

The most important requirement for systematic data on issues is explicit evidence of contention involving official representatives of two or more nation-states over the issue type in question; without explicit contention there is no reasonable way to identify issues. With the ICOW territorial claims data, for example, this means evidence that official representatives of at least one state make explicit statements claiming sovereignty over a specific piece of territory that is claimed or administered by another state. It is also important that official government representatives or individuals authorized to speak for the government initiate the claim.

The ICOW data is well suited for testing theories about IOs and cooperation because the project sets the initial threshold for conflict at a very low level: verbal claims. This creates considerable variance in the evolution of issue claims, with some becoming militarized repeatedly and others being resolved solely through peaceful means. The ICOW data also provides information about different types of conflict management strategies (e.g. bilateral talks, good offices, inquiry, conciliation, mediation, arbitration, and adjudication), information about any third party actors involved (states, IOs), as well as information about the outcomes of each peaceful attempt to settle the issue. Even though the data set focuses on issue disagreements, it also provides information about the ability of claimants to reach cooperative bargains peacefully.

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\(^9\) Version 1.0 of the ICOW data is available at [http://www.icow.org](http://www.icow.org). The website also provides documentation describing the data, as well as working papers employing the data.

\(^10\) Analyses employ the most recent version of the ICOW data, which includes territorial claim data for the Western Hemisphere and Western Europe, maritime claim data for the Western Hemisphere, and river claim data for the Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, and the Middle East. Analyses employing just the Western Hemisphere data, where all three issues have been coded, are similar to the results presented in this paper.
as well as substantive information about the type of agreement that is reached (functional, procedural substantive), \textsuperscript{11} and information about who gets what in the agreement (challenger gets more, even concessions, target gets more). ICOW also collects information on the outcomes of peaceful attempts to settle contentious issues, coding whether agreements are struck and whether claimants ratify and/or comply with the agreements’ terms. This provides additional leverage for evaluating theoretical claims about cooperation and compliance (Mitchell and Hensel, 2006).

The ICOW data is used to construct information at three points in the dyadic conflict process: 1) the onset of a new issue claim in a given year, 2) peaceful or militarized management attempts to settle an ongoing issue claim in a given claim dyad year, and 3) the success of peaceful settlement attempts with respect to whether claimants reach agreements and/or comply with their terms. Stage one requires identification of a set of dyads where an issue claim could potentially occur, something akin to politically relevant dyads in the study of militarized conflict (Lemke and Reed, 2001). Cases identified in stage one focus only on the Western Hemisphere because this is the only region for which data collection on all three issues (territory, maritime, and river) is complete.

First, each state in the Western Hemisphere (COW country codes 2-199) is paired with every other state in the region. Analyses are not restricted to geographically proximate states because territorial claims sometimes involve islands, states that share river basins do not always share land borders, and the mobility of fishing fleets creates the potential for maritime claims between non-contiguous states. Second, all major powers are paired with each state in the Western Hemisphere given their global interests and extensive military reach. Major powers are identified based on the Correlates of War Project’s definition of a major power (Small and Singer, 1982), and include Austria-Hungary (1816-1918), China (1950-present), France (1816-1940, 1945-present), Germany (1816-1918, 1925-1945, 1991-present), Great Britain (1816-present), Italy (1860-1943), Japan (1895-1945, 1991-present), Russia (1816-1917, 1922-present), and the United States (1898-present). These coding rules produce a total of 39,442 dyads from

\textsuperscript{11} The coding of \textit{peaceful} attempted settlements includes negotiations meant to settle part or all of issue under contention (“substantive” settlement attempts), negotiations over procedures for future settlement of the claim (“procedural” settlement attempts, such as a treaty submitting the claim to arbitration by a specific third party or an agreement to meet for new negotiations at some specific time), and negotiations over the use of the claimed area or river without attempting to settle the question of ownership (“functional” settlement attempts, such as a treaty of free navigation along a disputed river border). Any other types of negotiations (e.g., talks over a ceasefire to stop an ongoing crisis or war that do not include any functional or procedural elements beyond stopping the fighting) are excluded.
1920-2001\textsuperscript{12} where issue claims could occur. This variable takes on a value of one when one or more new territorial, maritime, or river issue claims begins in that year, and zero otherwise; 94 (0.24\%) of the total dyads experience issue claim onset. I also estimate a separate model for issue claim onset focusing just on territorial claims, given that territorial issues are viewed as highly salient issues in general to states (Hensel, 2001).

Empirical analyses of issue claim onsets are useful for determining if longer shared IO memberships promote convergence of members’ interests and identities and hence reduce the likelihood of contentious claims. My approach also improves upon existing designs (e.g. Russett and Oneal, 2001) that code the dependent variable as the presence or absence of militarized conflict, which makes it difficult to ascertain whether shared IO memberships depress militarized conflict because member states do not have conflicts in general or because the IO helps its members to manage conflicts that arise.\textsuperscript{13}

The second stage focuses on situations where states have made explicit territorial, maritime, or river issue claims and includes all available data for the Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, and the Middle East from 1920-2001. The unit of analysis is a claim dyad year. For example, the Pacific Salmon maritime claim between the US and Canada begins in 1914 and ends in 1999, producing a total of 86 claim dyad years. For all three regions, the ICOW Project has (thus far) identified a total of 5,259 claim dyad-years from 1920-2001. This data is useful for looking at the frequency of peaceful and militarized settlement attempts. For example, one or more peaceful settlement attempts occur in 13.2\% of claim dyad-years, while one or more militarized disputes occur in 3.3\% of claim dyad-years. Furthermore, because shared IO memberships (frequency and time) change over the course of issue claims, temporal variance in the IO measures can be adequately captured.

The third stage focuses explicitly on peaceful attempts to settle contentious issue claims. The unit of analysis is a peaceful settlement attempt, such as a mediation effort or bilateral talks. Analyses focused on peaceful attempts are ideal for looking at the outcomes of interstate bargaining processes, and can help determine whether shared IO memberships influence the success of specific settlement attempts. There are a total of 1,444 peaceful attempts to settle

\textsuperscript{12} Some analyses are restricted temporally because I employ two IO measures based on recognition of compulsory jurisdiction in the Permanent Court of International Justice (1920-1945) and the International Court of Justice (1946-present).

\textsuperscript{13} Some studies do examine the influence of IGO memberships on cooperation levels, such as McCormick (1980).
issue claims in all regions (1816-2001), with 827 (57.3%) of these attempts producing agreements, and compliance with agreements occurring in 622 (75.2%) of the 827 cases.

While these measures for the dependent variables are reasonable, it is more difficult to measure the effects of IOs on bargaining. As noted above, previous scholars have typically counted the frequency of shared IO memberships, which usually includes all types of international organizations. Boehmer et al (2004) point out the potential problems with this strategy, especially if the variance in institutional design influences the relationship between shared IO membership and cooperation. In this sense, a general measure of the frequency of shared IO memberships may give misleading results. Rather than measure institutional design directly in this paper, I make a simplifying assumptions, identifying only those regional or global international organizations that might influence member states’ peaceful conflict management behavior.

One measure employed here focuses on a single conflict management institution, the World Court (the Permanent Court of International Justice (1920-1945) and the International Court of Justice (1946-present)). A second measure identifies a broader set of IOs that include explicit statements about the peaceful settlement of interstate disputes in their charters, what I call peace-promoting IOs. Given that the ICOW data focuses on the management of contentious issues, a restriction of the IO measure along this dimension is reasonable. Furthermore, the variance in the institutional design of these IOs is fairly small, with the vast majority of the organizations being highly institutionalized, centralized, and employing inclusive membership rules. On the other hand, peace-promoting institutions often include a wide variety of member states with divergent interests, and thus may present a “harder” test for the hypotheses above.

Two measures for shared IO commitments are created utilizing information on states’ recognition of the PCIJ and/or ICJ. The first measure, Joint ICJ, is a dichotomous variable equaling one if both states in a dyad accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the PCIJ or ICJ with or without restrictions. A coding of zero for Joint ICJ denotes situations where only one side accepts compulsory jurisdiction or neither does. The data are collected from the annual volumes of the Yearbook of the International Court of Justice (http://www.icj-cij.org), noting any declarations by states with respect to the optional clause and any reservations placed on these

14 There are numerous types of reservations for optional clause declarations including restrictions related to certain states (ratione personae), certain times of disputes (ratione temporis), divergent areas of international law (ratione materiae), general reservations (such as reciprocity), and others (Szafarz, 1993).
declarations. When considering all state-years from 1920 to 2002 (since the inception of the PCIJ) states accept the optional clause (with or without reservations) in 34.4% of all state-years (Powell and Mitchell, 2006). The majority of states, which accept PCIJ/ICJ compulsory jurisdiction, place some reservations on it (27.5% of state-years). Only a minority accepts the optional clause without any reservation (6.9% of state-years).

The second measure, Joint ICJ Time, captures the number of years both states in a dyad have recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the PCIJ and/or ICJ. This measure takes on non-zero values only when Joint ICJ equals one to exclude potential monadic effects of only one side recognizing the World Court’s jurisdiction for an extended period of time. This measure of the length of commitment helps to capture the constitutive effects of the institution on its members. The validity of this measure depends on an assumption that a member’s support for an organization’s norms increases as time in the organization increases (Hooghe, 2005: 867).

The third IO measure (Joint IO Memberships) is based on a count of multilateral treaties and institutions calling for the peaceful settlement of disputes that both states in a dyad have signed and ratified. The greater the number of treaties or institutions that both states have accepted, the greater is the pressure on them to settle their disputes peacefully rather than through militarized means. Membership in qualifying institutions is measured through the ICOW Project’s Multilateral Treaties of Pacific Settlement (MTOPS) data set, which records the signature and ratification of all multilateral treaties and institutions (at either the global or regional level) that explicitly call for the pacific settlement of political disputes among members.

Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, 1973 Organization/Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the 1945 League of Arab States. Because this measure includes optional clause declarations under the PCIJ and/or ICJ, the information on the World Court is a subset of this broader IO measure. I turn now to a series of bivariate analyses to evaluate my theoretical hypotheses.

**Empirical Analyses**

I begin by examining the influence of shared IO memberships on the onset of new issue claims. Table 1 presents six models: Models 1A-1C capture issue claim onset with each of the three IO measures entered separately, while Models 2A-2C limit the issues at stake to territorial claims. In general, we see that shared IO memberships have a positive and statistically significant effect on issue or territorial claim onset in five of the six models. Model 1A looks at the effect of joint ICJ acceptance, and reveals that the probability of claim onset is twice as great if both states recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the PCIJ/ICJ. The substantive results for all models are reported in Table 4, and we can see that the likelihood of issue claim onset increases from .0020 to .0045 when we turn on the joint ICJ dummy variable. A similar effect is observed for territorial claims, which are in general more salient and contentious. The probability of a new territorial claim is .0007 for two states that do not jointly accept ICJ jurisdiction, increasing to .0013 if both sides recognize the Court.

Length of commitment to the ICJ does not seem to alter this relationship; in Model 1B and Model 2B (Table 1), joint ICJ time has a positive and significant effect on both issue claim and territorial claim onset. Moving from the mean to the maximum time raises the likelihood of issue claim onset from .0023 to .0085 and the probability of territorial claim onset from .0007 to .0027. Thus longer commitments to the PCIJ/ICJ make states more rather than less likely to initiate issue claims. These results seem to go against the expectations of the constitutive hypotheses, especially H2A, which anticipated that increases in dyadic shared time in IOs would

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15 This data set is available at <http://data.icow.org>, including documentation that lists the excerpts of the treaty or charter that call for the pacific settlement of disputes.
16 I also plan to create joint time measures for the MTOPS data but this is a time consuming task because the data are coded only at the monadic level.
17 While the results reported below are derived from bivariate models, each of the empirical models was estimated with a series of control variables employed in other ICOW analyses. In the future, I plan to add better information about the robustness of the bivariate results by reporting the range of estimated parameters for the key theoretical variables across all estimated models.
reduce the likelihood of new issue claims. Furthermore, these results hold when removing cases involving the United States and cases involving any major powers. Thus minor powers seem to exhibit the same tendencies to initiate more issue claims when they are committed to the World Court and their length of commitment increases.

The results for joint IO memberships more broadly (Model 1C and 2C) are mixed, with joint IO memberships significantly increasing the chances for issue claims, but having no effect on territorial claims. Moving from the mean IO membership value to the maximum, we see an increase in the probability of claim onset from .0022 to .0090. All of these substantive effects are fairly small, which is not surprising given the rareness of the dependent variable. Yet, the results reported in Table 1 are fairly consistent when control variables for regime type, relative power, rivalry status, alliance ties, distance, and foreign policy similarity are added. In short, shared and longer IO commitments have not prevented the initiation of new issue claims, at least in the Western Hemisphere over the past 80 years.

Table 2 focuses on the next stage of the conflict process, analyzing claim dyad-years. This includes all available ICOW claim data in the Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, and the Middle East from 1920-2001. These analyses focus on the use of peaceful and/or militarized strategies to resolve the issue at stake. Table 2 presents six models: Models 1A-1C report results for peaceful settlement attempts (one or more in a given dyad year), while Models 2A-2C report results for one or more militarized disputes over the particular issue at stake. Models 1A-1C show that joint ICJ acceptance, joint ICJ time, and joint IO memberships have negative and significant effects on the likelihood that peaceful settlement attempts are employed in a given year (this includes bilateral and third party efforts). Recognition of the ICJ by both claimants reduces the probability of peaceful settlement attempts from .1581 to .1207. Increasing shared ICJ time from its minimum to maximum moves the likelihood of peaceful attempts from .1556 to .0922, while shared IO memberships in peace promoting institutions reduces the peaceful

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18 These analyses employ the Correlates of War data on IGOs, which accounts for the loss of cases. Prior to World War II, COW coded information on IGOs at five-year intervals only. The next version of this paper will replace this measure with a dyadic count of shared membership in MTOPS institutions. It will also add a measure for shared IO time in MTOPS institutions, which will provide an alternative operationalization for the constitutive effect.

19 For each year of an ongoing issue claim, we identify all militarized disputes where the claimants are on opposing sides, using version 3.02 of the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set (Ghosn and Palmer 2003). We then look through historical sources to determine whether the militarized dispute in question was related directly to the territorial, maritime, or river claim in question; this allows us to capture more effectively whether the parties resorted to force explicitly over the issue, removing MIDs over other issues.
settlement from .1669 to .1235 when we move from the minimum to the maximum value. These results are contrary to the predictions from both the institutionalist and constructivist camps. The constraint hypothesis ($H_{1A}$) predicted that IOs would help facilitate conflict management for their member states either by getting directly involved as managers or indirectly by encouraging members to resolve issue claims on their own. The constitutive hypothesis ($H_{2B}$) predicted that increasing shared time in IOs would produce a convergence of interests and thus provide greater incentives for states to resolve outstanding issues.

However, these results are driven primarily by the decision to include both bilateral and third party settlements in the measure of peaceful settlement attempts. If we separate bilateral and third party peaceful settlement attempts, we find that a higher number of shared IO memberships in peace promoting institutions significantly increases the chances for third party settlement attempts, while significantly decreasing the chances for bilateral negotiations (Kadera and Mitchell, 2005; Mitchell, Kadera, and Crescenzi, 2006). Thus IO memberships do promote more community based methods for resolving conflicts, but they do not necessarily enhance all forms of peaceful settlement.20

Table 2, Models 2A-2C present results for militarized disputes over the issues at stake, using again the claim dyad year as the unit of analysis. Here we find mixed results. Joint recognition of PCIJ/ICJ compulsory jurisdiction significantly decreases the probability of militarized conflict (.0384 to .0185). Similarly, the longer the shared commitment to the PCIJ/ICJ in the dyad, the less likely the two states are to resort to force. As we move from the minimum to the maximum value for joint ICJ time, the probability of militarized confrontation drops from .0352 to .0170. Interestingly, though, the results for joint IO memberships more broadly (Model 2C) show a positive and significant effect of IO memberships on militarized force, contrary to both the constraining ($H_{1C}$) and constitutive ($H_{2D}$) hypotheses. These results are consistent with Hensel’s (2001) findings for a positive effect of shared institutions (also using the MTOPS data) on militarized disputes using a sample of territorial claims in the Western Hemisphere from 1816-2001. These results are most likely a function of the dominance of Western Hemisphere cases in the data set because the region has been among the most

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20 The results in Mitchell, Kadera, and Crescenzi (2006) employ only the Western Hemisphere data and do not look at the effects of Joint ICJ or Joint ICJ Time. Those analyses show that institutions are significantly more likely to serve directly as third party mediators in a given settlement attempt when both sides have higher numbers of shared IO memberships.
institutionalized in the world with respect to regional agreements that explicitly call for peaceful settlement in their charters. However, the results for the ICJ measures are consistent with the view that IO membership (frequency and duration) produces more pacific behavior between member states.

Finally, Table 3 reports the results for the success of specific peaceful attempts to settle territorial, maritime, and river issue claims. Models 1A-1C report results for whether claimants reach an agreement, while Models 2A-2C report results for compliance with any agreements reached (selecting out only those cases where an agreement was reached in the first stage). First, joint ICJ acceptance and increased joint time in the ICJ significantly increase the chances that two sides will reach an agreement. The dichotomous ICJ measure raises the probability of agreement from .5582 to .6624, while a shift from the minimum to the maximum ICJ time increases the probability of agreement from .5602 to .7442. Thus the results employing the ICJ measures support both the constraining \((H_{1B})\) and constitutive \((H_{2C})\) IO hypotheses. Commitment to the ICJ helps produce more efficient interstate bargaining, and yet the duration of that commitment also matters as well. States that have recognized compulsory jurisdiction for longer periods of time are better able to strike peaceful accords. The broader measure for joint IO memberships in Model 1C, Table 3 is positive as expected, but fails to reach statistical significance at the .90 level. These results are similar to those reported in Kadera and Mitchell (2005) and Mitchell, Kadera, and Crescenzi (2006), where joint institutions have no significant effect on agreements.

Models 2A-2C in Table 3 report results for compliance with agreements struck. Compliance is coded positively when both sides carry out the terms of the agreement within five years (see Mitchell and Hensel 2006). Joint ICJ acceptance, joint ICJ time, and joint IO memberships all have positive and significant effects on compliance rates. Joint ICJ acceptance increases the probability of compliance from .7467 to .8570, while joint ICJ time has a strong effect as well, raising the probability from .7379 to .9016 as we move from the minimum to the maximum value. The results for joint IO memberships are also substantial, increasing the probability of compliance from .6887 to .9071 when we increase the measure from its minimum to its maximum. These results support the constraining hypothesis \((H_{1B})\), suggesting perhaps

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21 Mitchell and Hensel (2006) run Heckman selection models for reaching agreement and compliance and find no significant correlation across the models’ error terms.
that IOs facilitate the signing of credible agreements between their member states. The results for joint ICJ time also provide support for the constitutive argument as well; joint time in the institution produces more efficient and successful bargaining processes.

**Conclusion**

This paper analyzes the constraining and constitutive effects of international organizations on member states’ behavior. Institutionalist and rationalist arguments suggest that IOs will have their greatest effects on interstate bargaining between members by reducing transactions costs, increasing information flows, enhancing legal liability, lengthening the shadow of the future, raising reputation costs, and reducing commitment problems. This perspective treats IOs as constraints because it assumes that they make bargaining more efficient and successful, but that IOs do not fundamentally alter states’ preferences. A contrasting viewpoint comes from constructivist IO theories, which point to the autonomous power of IOs and their bureaucrats to promote new ideas and norms. If successfully transmitted to member states, IOs have the power to alter members’ long-term interests and identities. Long and deep commitments to organizations should produce stronger socialization effects. Institutionalist, rationalist, and constructivist scholars also emphasize institutional design, identifying various characteristics of organizations that influence their constraining and constitutive effects.

Various hypotheses are derived from these existing arguments in the international relations literature. Constraining hypotheses focus on shared IO memberships (joint frequency), while constitutive hypotheses focus on the duration of IO commitments (joint time). The hypotheses are then evaluated using data on contentious territorial, maritime, and river issues. Empirical models look at the onset of new verbal issue claims, the peaceful and/or militarized management of existing issue claims, and the success of specific efforts to settle issues peacefully (reaching agreements, compliance). IO measures are developed using information on states’ commitments to the World Court and to peace-promoting regional and global organizations.

If two states accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court, they are more likely to reach cooperative agreements and comply with their terms and less likely to employ militarized force to resolve contentious issues. On the other hand, recognition of the Court does not prevent the initiation of new issue claims, nor promote all forms of peaceful settlement
successfully. Joint IO memberships in a broader set of peace-promoting institutions have very mixed results on the onset and management of contentious issues. Greater numbers of joint IO memberships make the initiation of issue claims more likely and paradoxically reduce the likelihood of peaceful settlement attempts while increasing the probability of militarized confrontation. Peace-promoting institutions promote third party settlements and enhance compliance with agreements reached, but they do not produce more efficient bilateral bargaining among member states nor prevent them from escalating to the level of force. Finally, the longer two states have recognized the World Court’s compulsory jurisdiction, the more likely they are to strike credible and durable agreements. However, joint PCIJ/ICJ time does not prevent the onset of new contentious issues, nor effectively promote peaceful settlement attempts.

These results are consistent with recent arguments about the diversity of IOs and variance in their ability to promote cooperative behavior among member states. The results for negotiations, though, suggest that IO memberships and long commitments to such institutions have very positive effects once contending parties reach the bargaining table. But they do not necessarily have great success in getting conflicting member states to negotiate. Furthermore, direct IO involvement in the conflict management process does not always work. Binding and active forms of IO involvement, such as arbitration and adjudication, have very high success rates, and yet non-binding strategies such as mediation and good offices may actually fare worse than bilateral negotiations (Mitchell and Hensel, 2006). In short, even when restricting analyses to IOs that promote peaceful conflict management techniques in their charters, we observe a great deal of variance in the adoption of peaceful management strategies and their success. One possible explanation for this variance lies in the heterogeneity of interests represented in the peace-promoting IOs analyzed in this paper. Many are very general global or regional organizations and thus their members differ from each other on a variety of dimensions. It would be interesting to code more specific information about the design of these institutions based both on their charters and on various characteristics of member states (both at formation and over time). It would also be useful to expand our coding of PCIJ and ICJ jurisdiction, especially to include information about jurisdiction that stems from compromissory clauses in bilateral or multilateral treaties (Powell and Mitchell, 2006). Recent work on IOs as social networks may also give us better leverage for capturing heterogeneity of members’ preferences and tracking how these evolve over time (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2006).
The analyses in this paper may not fully capture potential selection effects in the IO creation process (von Stein, 2005). We must be able to distinguish between factors that encourage states to create new IOs (or join existing IOs) from the effects of IO membership on state identities. Do states with similar interests join IOs, or does joining an IO create (or constitute) similar interests among members (or both)? Analyses herein focus on the effects of IO membership, rather than looking carefully at IO formation. It would be useful to look at the influences of IO commitments that pre-date contentious issues versus IO commitments that follow the initiation of issue claims. Perhaps contentious issues create great impetus for organizational formation, a pattern that may manifest itself strongly in the Western Hemisphere. This region is characterized both by a great deal of interstate contention and by a great deal of regional institutionalization. For example, all but one land border in the region has been contested in the past two hundred years (Hensel, Mitchell, and Sowers, 2006). Whether the existence of these contentious issue claims spurred states to create organizations is debatable and the evidence in this paper does not yet allow us to answer this potential critique. However, comparative tests of constraining and constitutive hypotheses are promising for identifying the mechanisms of the shared IO-cooperation relationship and for uncovering which institutional features best promote cooperative interactions.
REFERENCES


Table 1: IO Commitments and the Initiation of Contentious Issue Claims, Western Hemisphere, 1920-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1A: Issue Claim Onset</th>
<th>Model 1B: Issue Claim Onset</th>
<th>Model 1C: Issue Claim Onset</th>
<th>Model 2A: Territorial Claim Onset</th>
<th>Model 2B: Territorial Claim Onset</th>
<th>Model 2C: Territorial Claim Onset</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>0.842***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.686*</td>
<td>0.009*</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.226)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.413)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
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<td>Joint ICJ Time</td>
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<td>0.009***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.030***</td>
<td>0.009*</td>
<td>0.009*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint IO Memberships</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.030***</td>
<td>0.009*</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-6.223***</td>
<td>-6.158***</td>
<td>-6.946***</td>
<td>-7.323***</td>
<td>-7.298***</td>
<td>-6.451***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
<td>(0.330)</td>
<td>(0.213)</td>
<td>(0.204)</td>
<td>(0.499)</td>
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<td>N</td>
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<td>39,442</td>
<td>25,983</td>
<td>39,442</td>
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<td>25,983</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$; Unit of analysis is dyad-year
Table 2: IO Commitments and Peaceful and Militarized Attempts to Settle Contentious Issue Claims, 1920-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1A: Peaceful Settlement Attempts</th>
<th>Model 1B: Peaceful Settlement Attempts</th>
<th>Model 1C: Peaceful Settlement Attempts</th>
<th>Model 2A: Militarized Settlement Attempts</th>
<th>Model 2B: Militarized Settlement Attempts</th>
<th>Model 2C: Militarized Settlement Attempts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint ICJ Acceptance</td>
<td>-0.314*** (0.094)</td>
<td>-0.004** (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.750*** (0.218)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint ICJ Time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.005* (0.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint IO Memberships</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.032** (0.012)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.044* (0.023)</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.672*** (0.044)</td>
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</table>

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01; Unit of analysis is claim dyad-year

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Joint ICJ (p=.031) & Joint ICJ Time (p=.057) have negative and statistically significant effects on the onset of militarized disputes with fatalities.
Table 3: IO Commitments and the Peaceful Management of Contentious Issue Claims, 1816-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1A: Reach Agreement</th>
<th>Model 1B: Reach Agreement</th>
<th>Model 1C: Reach Agreement</th>
<th>Model 2A: Compliance</th>
<th>Model 2B: Compliance</th>
<th>Model 2C: Compliance</th>
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<tr>
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<td>0.710** (0.263)</td>
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<td>Joint ICJ Time</td>
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<td>0.007** (0.003)</td>
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<td>0.010** (0.004)</td>
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<td>Joint IO Memberships</td>
<td></td>
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<td>0.027 (0.018)</td>
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<td>0.135*** (0.032)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.234*** (0.057)</td>
<td>0.242*** (0.056)</td>
<td>0.223*** (0.070)</td>
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* * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01; Unit of analysis is peaceful settlement attempt
Table 4: Substantive Effects, All Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joint ICJ</th>
<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Table 2</th>
<th>Table 3</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Issue Claim Onset</td>
<td>Territorial Claim Onset</td>
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<tr>
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